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As a result of several food and chemical-related public health scares as well as strong 
activism by environmental organization such as Greenpeace, longstanding majorities of EU 
citizens support restrictions on the authorization and use of GMOs for human and animal 
consumption in the European Union. Given the EU’s ongoing Democratic Deficit and the 
deepening crisis of faith in recent years in European institutions, the European Commission under 
the leadership of Jean-Claude Juncker has been attempting to respond to these public desires with 
a series of proposed regulatory reforms. 
However, Juncker’s policy proposals pose an enormous quandary for European Institutions 
for several reasons. Namely, they contravene rulings by both the European Court of Justice and 
the World Trade Organization and threaten the integrity of the European Single Market and the 
vitality of European economic competitiveness; further, when placed in the context of long-term 
regulatory changes in the EU, they threaten to reduce the role of scientific expertise in 
policymaking decisions, with implications for European technological and scientific leadership.  
Several key questions arise from the current predicament regarding GMO Regulations in 
Europe, and which this thesis will attempt to address. First, how did the history of European food 
and GM regulation lead to this current impasse and how does it frame the current debate? Second, 
what are the arguments in favor of the reforms proposed by the Juncker Commission? Third, what 
are the primary arguments against these reforms? This research will show that there is strong 
evidence both for and against the reforms. In light of this evidence, this thesis will provide tentative 
answers to a final question: what should European institutions do about the GMO question, and 
are there possible resolutions to this dilemma?  
 To answer the questions, after situating the situation in the institutional history of food and 
GMO regulations, this work will take the following course: first, it will detail the regulatory history 
and comitological rules that create one element of the dilemma, and the proposed reforms that 
would resolve the dilemma. Second, it will analyze the nature of Europe’s democratic deficit and 
ongoing populist legitimacy crisis as informed by the political philosophies of Jürgen Habermas. 
Then, it will explain the institutional and structural constraints such as European law and World 
Trade Organization rulings that pose an enormous quandary for the proponents of Juncker’s 
reforms and show that Schumpeter’s elaboration of the Public Choice Dilemma is at work. 
Ultimately, the broad strokes of the regulatory status quo should be preserved, but several specific 
points can be reformed in more democratic ways. This investigation draws implications for the 
intersection of public opinion, regulation, and science policy in the EU and throughout Western 
democracies, and finds that science and democracy should and do occupy separate spheres. 
 
Keywords: European Union; GMOs; Technocracy; Health and Safety Regulation; Limits of 
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Science and technology have long been key drivers of global economic, social, and political 
relationships. From gunpowder and the telescope to evolutionary theory and nuclear technology, 
scientific changes have often entailed enormous upheavals that bring the promise of greater human 
prosperity while threatening the established social, political and cultural order. Political leaders, 
regulatory bodies, and the people they serve must, when confronted with new advances, grapple 
with questions of societal good, cost-benefit analyses, and market dynamics. In an organization as 
complex and influential as the European Union, this process of regulating new technologies is a 
long and circuitous one, involving several institutions and governing bodies, sometimes failing to 
deliver policies that are in line with popular opinion. In recent decades, however, the European 
Union has been adopting regulatory processes that are more responsive to public desires and 
employ more democratically legitimate decisionmaking structures. Though these changes have 
been transpiring across many European regulatory fields, one particularly contentious and salient 
test case for such reforms is the topic of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).  
As a result of several food and chemical-related public health scares as well as strong 
activism by environmental organization such as Greenpeace, longstanding majorities of EU 
citizens support restrictions on the authorization and use of GMOs for human and animal 
consumption in the European Union. Given the EU’s ongoing Democratic Deficit and the 
deepening crisis of faith in recent years in European institutions, the European Commission under 
the leadership of Jean-Claude Juncker has been making an effort to respond to these public desires 
with a series of proposed regulatory reforms. 
The Juncker Commission has made two main reform proposals. First, in 2015, the 




containing ingredients of GMO origin to be sold on their territories. Second, after failing to receive 
traction on the “GMO ban,” in 2017 the Commission proposed a reform to regulatory committee 
procedure, backed by anti-GMO advocacy groups, which would allow committee deadlocks (that 
have resulted in the approval of new strains of genetically modified organisms) to be resolved in 
the favor of the EU Member States who oppose the approval. Upon again not receiving sufficient 
support for this proposal, the Commission, and Commission President Juncker himself, have 
continued to agitate for ways to restrict the continued approval and sale of GMO products in 
Member States whose governments and populations are generally opposed to such products. These 
efforts on behalf of the Commission do seem to represent a genuine desire on the part of the 
Juncker administration to respond to public pressures and introduce more transparency and 
democracy into the regulation of GM technologies. 
However, Juncker’s policy proposals pose an enormous quandary for European Institutions 
for several reasons. Namely, they directly contravene rulings by both the European Court of Justice 
and the World Trade Organization and threaten the integrity of the European Single Market and 
the vitality of European economic competitiveness; further, they threaten to sideline scientific 
expertise in making decisions with implications for public health.  
In the first case, the European Court of Justice has repeatedly upheld the core EU principle 
of the Single Market – the idea that all goods that can be legally sold in one EU country can be 
sold across the EU without institutional trade barriers of any kind, be they tariff or non-tariff in 
origin.1 This idea of the Single Market is of such importance to the integrity of the European Union 
that its principles are known as the Four Freedoms – free movement of services, people, capital, 
and goods – that form the bedrock of European integration and jurisprudence. As such, the idea 
                                                          





that some Member States might be granted the authority to prevent the sale of GM products that 
are the legal products of other Member States would be deleterious to the integrity of the Single 
Market and European law – regardless of the level of popular support that such a policy might 
achieve (the exception regarding Health and Safety is discussed in chapter IV) .  
In the second case, the European Union, as a member of the World Trade Organization, 
enjoys treaty-regulated access to the markets of other WTO members in return for its own 
commitment to the elimination of trade barriers to their products. Though the EU has sought in the 
past to use public health and popular opinion as rationale for stringent GMO regulatory policies, 
the WTO arbitration body has ruled against the EU for, in the WTO opinion, a de-facto moratorium 
on the approval of GM products, which effectively constitute a trade barrier against the GM 
products of other countries.2 Once more, applying greater restrictions on GMOs, though in keeping 
with popular opinion and the expressed desires of democratically-elected governments, would 
contravene international WTO rulings and result in significant difficulties for EU trade growth, 
particularly in its ongoing trade negotiations with the United States.  
Further, related to the issue of the WTO and trade, GM technology and biotechnologies as 
a whole are a rapidly growing industry that attracts billions of dollars in international investment; 
as a possible result of the EU’s skeptical attitude toward many GM-related biotechnologies, the 
EU is falling significantly behind China and the United States in biotechnology investment; 
further, those EU countries that have adopted more GM-friendly stances have received 
disproportionate shares of the biotech advancement and investment that does occur in Europe. 
Thus, while European consumers may be seeking to secure a certain conception of their own best 
                                                          
2 “Dispute Settlement DS292: European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 





interests through regulating or eliminating GMOs, they may be doing so through policies and 
attitudes that are injurious in other regards.  
Finally, though more abstractly, such policies and procedures as proposed by the Juncker 
Commission and supported by members of the Anti-GMO coalition form part of a growing trend 
in European regulation that seeks to prioritize popular sentiment about scientific concepts over 
consensus within the scientific community, and dilutes the role of subject matter experts. In 2017 
article that excoriates EU GMO regulatory policy, Giovanni Tagliabue draws attention to the 
patchwork nature of European GMO regulations, and the paradoxes inherent in the status quo: a 
restrictive regulatory framework on GMO cultivation but relatively unrestricted imports of 
genetically modified organisms for animal feed; the commonplace prohibitions on protection 
against cultivation, juxtaposed with the European Parliament’s 2015 rejection of Commission-
proposed prohibitions on importation on grounds of damage to the common market; perhaps most 
importantly the labelling of “genetic modification” as a new and risky technology while the 
products of the most invasive and scientifically corporatized breeding and hybridization programs 
and monocropping can be considered relatively “natural.” Tagliabue remarks that “This dynamics 
[sic] may be seen as an ongoing ‘Schumpeterian’ chain of public choices: the calculus of consent 
drives politicians more than a science-based approach to law-making.”3  
Tagliabue thus raises a vital and important point regarding the nature of regulatory 
behavior: to what extent should policymakers respond to the “calculus of consent” over a “science-
based approach” to regulation?4 As further sections shall discuss, a Public Choice dilemma occurs 
when there is significant divergence of opinion between the desires of the public and the 
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preferences of subject matter experts and policy makers. Though the dangers of technocracy and 
elitism must be kept in mind, anti-expert populism comes with its own downsides as well, and thus 
the narrow regulatory issue of GMOs has implications that have become all the more relevant in 
the current age of populist sentiment throughout the West. 
Together, these strands constitute a major dilemma: between institutionally, legally, and 
economically constrained policy on the one hand, and popular democratic desires on the other – a 
situation that, as Tagliabue points out, qualifies as a Schumpeterian Public Choice Dilemma. 
Though the discursive and regulatory philosophies of Jürgen Habermas offer several suggestions 
to resolve these conflicts in the direction of democracy, transparency, and legitimacy, the school 
of Schumpeterian Public Choice theory offers rebuttals, arguing for an embrace of technocratic 
expert consensus over the preferences of the people who have little expertise in the subjects under 
discussion or the consequences of proposed policies. Ultimately, the package of reforms proposed 
by President Juncker would be harmful if passed in their current forms, but, further, the conflict 
between popular preferences and institutional and economic realities calls into question several 
assumptions about the relationship between the body politic and “elite” decisionmakers, and has 
much broader resonance in this new age of populist iconoclasm. 
 
Research Questions and Scope of Work 
 
 Several key questions arise from the current predicament regarding GMO Regulations in 
Europe, and which this thesis will attempt to address. First, how did the history of European food 
and GM regulation lead to this current regulatory impasse and how does it frame the current 
debate? Second, what are the arguments in favor of the reforms proposed by the Juncker 




show that there are strong arguments both for and against the reforms. In light of this evidence, 
this thesis will touch on a final question: what should European institutions do about the GMO 
question, and are there possible resolutions to this dilemma? 
 The answers to these questions are informed by the philosophical outlooks of Jürgen 
Habermas on the one hand and Joseph Schumpeter on the other. Habermas argues for increasing 
democratization and transparency of European regulatory processes to ward off the growing 
democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis in the Union; Schumpeter, in contrast, argued against over-
democratization of policymaking, seeking instead to follow the consensus of experts that would 
avoid the pitfalls of populism. How this conflict between public opinion and attainable policy goals 
plays out may, in the end, have significant consequences for the structure of both European liberal 
democracy and the global economy more broadly, for what public pressure demands is 
significantly out of step with what is attainable given current international structures. 
 To answer the questions, after situating the current debate in the institutional history of 
food and GMO regulations, this work will take the following course: first, it will detail the 
regulatory history and comitological rules that have led to the dilemma and the proposed reforms 
that would resolve the dilemma of whether to allow increased barriers to GMOs in the EU. Second, 
it will analyze the nature of Europe’s democratic deficit and ongoing populist legitimacy crisis as 
informed by Habermas’s proposals. Then, it will explain the institutional and structural constraints 
such as European Law and World Trade Organization rulings that pose an enormous quandary for 
the proponents of Juncker and Habermas, and show that Schumpeter’s elaboration of the Public 
Choice Dilemma is certainly at work in this situation. 
 The research does not investigate the nature of the ideological divide regarding GMOs in 




proponents or opponents. Suffice it to say, there are strong arguments that should be carefully 
considered on all sides of the debate. Rather, this investigation will take it as sufficient to 
demonstrate that there is a substantial difference between public opinion on the one hand and the 
scientific community more generally. This difference, combined with the structural problems of 
EU law and international agreement, constitute the corpus of this dilemma, regardless of who (if 















Science and Regulation in the EU 
 
The European Commission, originally known as the Commission of the European 
Communities, was forged in 1968 from the European Coal and Steel Community, Commission of 
the European Economic Community, and Commission of the European Atomic Energy 
Community. With the advent of the European Commission, EU governance bodies succeeded in a 
centralization of European research direction and funding under its authority. The 1992 ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1994 heralding the official beginning of the 
European Union, created numerous institutions that drastically changed the course of EU science 
policy. First, the Maastricht Treaty Enshrined the precautionary principle (discussed below) as the 
regulatory standard.5  
The 2000 Lisbon Agenda brought even greater changes. “The 2000 Lisbon Agenda 
announced the EU's strategy to facilitate Europe's transition into a full-fledged and efficient 
‘knowledge-based society’ by 2010.  Science, not surprisingly, is portrayed as central to achieving 
this vision.” 6  The Lisbon Agenda was externally focused and geared toward economic 
competitiveness. Surrounding this strategy was a proliferation of new scientific institutions 
including the European Research Area (renamed European Research Area Board in 2001), the 
reaction to Commissioner for Research Philippe Busquin’s lament of the EU’s still-fragmented 
research agendas and networks, as well as the 2007 European Research Council.7 
As part of a greater push toward scientific competitiveness, in 2011, Commission President 
Jose Emmanuel Barroso appointed Professor Anne Glover as Chief Science Advisor (in 
                                                          
5 Barbara Berthoud, “The Precautionary Principle in EU Risk Regulation: A Matter of Priorities,” (Anchor Academic 
Publishing, 2014). 
6 Anwar Tlili and Emily Dawson, “Mediating Science and Society in the EU and UK: From Information-Transmission 
to Deliberative Democracy?” Minerva 48, no 4 (2010): 436. 




accordance with his 2009 declaration of intention to do so). The position was created to “provide 
[the president] high-level and independent scientific advice throughout all stages of policy 
development and delivery. The Chief Scientific Advisor will provide advice directly to the 
President and will give regular updates on major scientific and technological developments.8 
Throughout her tenure, Professor Glover was an outspoken proponent of the cultivation and 
advancement of genetically modified foods and related technologies. However, this overt 
advocacy was not without political consequences. 
The Policies of Jean Claude Juncker, in stark contrast to those of Barroso, tend to take a 
very different tone regarding the scientific community and its role in EU policymaking. Soon after 
taking office, in November 2014 Juncker abolished the position of science advisor, firing Professor 
Glover. In the May 2015 “Better Regulation” communication, the Juncker administration 
responded to member states who decried the Commission’s regulatory overreach by prioritizing 
member state input and devolving some comitological procedures.9 The official announcement 
declared that “Political priorities drive Commission action on the challenges that the EU faces 
today.  Better regulation is a tool to provide a basis for timely and sound policy decisions - but it 
can never replace political decisions,”10 stating in no uncertain terms that politics would be the 
ultimate rationale for regulatory decisions.  
Though the initiation of the Better Regulation initiative has far larger implications for the 
future of EU regulatory decisionmaking, the abolition of the post of EC Science Advisor stirred 
the greater controversy. In dismissing Professor Glover, signs indicate that the Juncker 
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http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1497_en.htm 






administration was heeding the calls of a coalition of environmental groups, the most notable being 
Greenpeace, who called for the dismissal of Anne Glover and abolition of the position on grounds 
of the role’s “intransparency” as well as outrage at the fact that Glover had given “one-sided, 
partial opinions in the debate on the use of genetically modified organisms.”11 The dismissal 
earned a vociferous rebuke from members of the science community. As a Telegraph article 
highlights following the dismissal, “‘It’s a sad day for science, policy, politics and the public in 
Europe,’ said Professor Colin Blakemore and the University of London,” [sic], a view that the 
article concatenates with similar opinions from a variety of viewpoints, including the 
representative of the World Health Organization to the EU.12 However, the dismissal was not 
based on expert difference on the matter; rather, “As the former prime minister of Luxembourg, a 
country that along with France, Austria, Greece and Hungary, that has banned, and is opposed, to 
the use of GM crops on political grounds, Mr. Juncker's personal views are well known. On taking 
the post as commission president… Mr Juncker has announced plans to review EU rules on 
authorising biotechnology in order to allow countries to ban their use.”13  
 
A Fragmented Regulatory Regime 
 
GMO policy in the EU is fractured. Only six of the currently 28 member states cultivate 
GMOs on their territory.14 The majority of this cultivation is concentrated in Spain and Portugal 
(Spain has the largest number of companies active in biotechnology in the OECD – 2,981 in 
                                                          
11 “The position of Chief Scientific Advisor to the President of the European Commission,” Greenpeace, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-unit/reports-
briefings/2014/20140722%20NGO%20letter%20on%20EU%20chief%20scientific%20adviser.pdf  
12 Bruno Waterfield, “Jean-Claude Juncker 'sacks' EU scientific adviser over her pro-GM views,” The Telegraph, 13 
November 2014. 
13 Idem. 
14 François Randour et al, “The Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: A Necessary 




2015).15 GMO-averse Austria, in contrast, has only 4% as many such firms despite an overall GDP 
that is more than 30% of that of Spain. 
Figure 1: Biotech firms by Country (OECD Biotechnology Indicators. 2015) 
Austria’s staunch anti-GMO stance has been the catalyst for numerous legal disputes 
within the EU. In the mid-1990s Austrian voters chose by referendum to ban the cultivation of 
GMOs outright on Austrian territory; the EU commission, seeing this as a potential obstacle to the 
free market, requested on three separate occasions for the EU Council to invalidate the referendum, 
which the Council refused by qualified majority to do on each occasion. Nevertheless, the 
Commission did succeed in forcing Austria to lift its ban for purposes of food and feed, to the 
detriment of the Commission’s public image in Austria and elsewhere.16 This history of what some 
see as strongarm tactics against member state anti-GMO policies – and the resulting damage in the 
perception of the ability of the EU to represent the desires of EU citizens – forms an important part 
of the backdrop to the Juncker Administration’s current and proposed GMO regulatory policies. 
                                                          
15 “Key biotechnology indicators,” OECD Directorate for Science Technology and Innovation, oe.cd/kbi Last update 
November 2017. 




The Juncker regime strives to improve public perceptions of the EU, the majority of whose citizens 
and governments do not look favorably upon the expansion of GMO cultivation and consumption.  
 
Coalitions and Stakeholders 
Central to the debate are two opposing groups whose areas of concern overlap on the issue of 
GMO regulation. One of the most influential frameworks on the nature of coalitions and how they 
interact with policymaking is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which describes 
advocacy coalitions as “people from a variety of positions[…]who show a non-trivial degree of 
coordinated activity over time” on a policy issue or set of policy issues.17 By incorporating and 
disseminating new information “on their own terms,” coalitions “adapt to the beliefs of another 
coalition, particularly when its views become ‘too important to ignore’”.18 Further, they do and 
must compete with other coalitions to translate their positions into policy, for “coalitions have to 
exercise power effectively to maintain or improve their positions within subsystems.”19  
In an analysis of the establishment of GMO policy in Turkey, Yagci (2018) uses the ACF 
to argue that Biotechnology companies and anti-GMO advocates were the main forces in 
articulating Turkish GMO policy, compromising on a protectionist strategy in a “Baptist-
bootlegger” fashion. In like fashion, Brooks (2018) employs the ACF to analyze coalitions that 
formed for and against Direct to Consumer Advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs, finding that 
active influence, persuasion, and governmental “control” were key to the victory of the anti-DTCA 
coalition.20 Though the biotechnology industry is a significant player in influencing public opinion 
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Public Policy, 5, no. 1 (1988):98-130. 139. 
18 Cairney 488 
19 Ibid 489. 
20 Eleanor Brooks, “Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework to understand EU pharmaceutical policy,” European 




in the EU on the GMO question, and the regulations discussed naturally have effects on the 
biotechnology industry, the subject of this research is not the formation of public perception but 
rather the successes and hopes of GMO opponents in achieving policy changes that contravene the 
opinions of, and diminish the regulatory influence of, the EU scientific community. For purposes 
of this research, therefore, the two primary groups of analysis are the Anti-Biotech Coalition and 
the Scientific Community. The Anti-Biotech coalition has been successful in translating policy 
preferences into European Union policy over the objections of the Scientific Community and to 
the detriment of the Biotechnology Industry. 
 
The Biotechnology Industry 
Thought not a main focus of this research, the European biotechnology is certain affected 
by the topics under discussion. The European biotechnology industry remains a substantial driver 
of European technological and economic growth, with biotechnology having been named a “Key 
Enabling Technology” as part of Europe’s Horizon 2020 program which aims to catalyze European 
technological leadership.21 Further, EU funding backs the Bio-Based Industries Joint Undertaking, 
“a €3.7 billion partnership between the EU and the Bio-based Industries Consortium,” similarly 
focused on creating jobs and scientific and technological infrastructure for future European 
leadership.22 The European biotechnology industry is substantial, though small compared to that 
in the US. In 2017, Europe boasted 234 public biotech companies versus 331 in the US; European 
IPOs resulted in €866 million raised, while American IPOs amounted to €2.03 billion; however, 
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http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/area/key-enabling-technologies. 




of the 234 public European biotech firms, only 1 was classified as an “agribiotechnology” firm.23 
According to 2015 OECD data (the most recent available), 2,005 dedicated biotechnology firms 
operated in the EU,  contributing a total of 3.8 billion USD in purchasing power parity.24 More 
detailed data on the size of the European biotechnology industry or sector is either vague or 
difficult to find; however, in 2016 an industry group reported that industrial biotechnology (just 
one part of the overall biotechnology industry, which also includes agricultural biotechnology and 
biomedical biotechnology) sustains 486,000 full-time equivalent jobs and contributes €31.6 billion 
in added value to the EU economy, with projection of 57.5-99.5 billion by 2030.25 
 
The Anti-Biotech Coalition 
 
The first significant coalition in the GMO debate is that which is opposed to GMOs and 
certain types of biotechnology more broadly. The previous section’s criticisms of GMOs do not 
represent disparate isolated voices but rather a bloc of many likeminded consumers and citizens. 
Biotechnology is a broad field encompassing technologies as diverse as biofuel production, 
medical treatment, and genetic engineering. As Kurzer and Cooper point out, there is a stark 
difference between perceptions of “red” (medical-related) and “green” (agriculture-related) 
biotechnology, with general acceptance of the former and much more widespread rejection of the 
latter. A coalition opposed to green biotechnologies, comprising “environment NGOs, consumer 
groups, and small traditional or organic farmers,” has been an effective force on the issue, and 
“intense popular opposition to GMO…provided a critical resource for the anti-biotech coalition.”  
For reasons that merit further investigation, the perceptions of the public – and consequently the 
                                                          
23 Data on private companies was not available. “European Biotechnology Science and Industry Guide,” European 
Biotechnology, https://european-biotechnology.com/euro-guide-2019.html  
24 OECD Key Biotechnology Indicators 




perceptions of their democratically elected governments – exhibit intractable differences on the 
topic of genetic modification, with naturalistic and ecologically-motivated beliefs dominating the 
opposition.26  
Critically, the anti-Biotech coalition has managed to both foster and draw on majority 
acceptance of its GMO policy preferences among European consumers. In a 2001 Eurobarometer 
poll, 71% of Europeans surveyed looked negatively on GMO food; “In 2001, an average of 71 per 
cent of the EU-15 public ‘did not want GM foods,’ while in 2005 62 per cent of the EU-25 public 
was ‘worried’ about GM foods and beverage.”27 By 2010, this number had changed to 54% though 
showing a strong correlation with having heard of or being knowledgeable about GMOs; no 
Eurobarometer polls on GMOs have been released since that time, though national polls reveal 
strongly negative attitudes.28 Further, a majority (51%) of Europeans expressed that the EU has 
taken insufficient action on environmental protection.29 
Kurzer and Cooper continue to outline that the Anti-Biotech Coalition has, as a result of 
this majority agreement, managed to achieve “three significant victories in the last decade”: first, 
“a de facto moratorium from 1998 to 2004 on the authorization of biotech crops,” second, 
                                                          
26 “Since Europe didn’t need GMOs and in general were suspicious of big agri-business, it became easy for Green 
parties, notably Greenpeace, to conflate the two issues,” Nobel Laureate Sir Richard Roberts. Sarantis 
Michalopoulous, "Nobel Laureate: EU politicians ignore ‘politically unwelcome’ GMO science,” Euractiv September 
27, 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/section/science-policymaking/interview/nobelist-eu-politicians-ignore-
politically-unwelcome-science/   
27 Paulette Kurzer and Alice Cooper, “Consumer Activism, EU Institutions and Global Markets: The Struggle over 
Biotech Foods,” Journal of Public Policy 27, no. 2 (May-Aug 2007): 108. 
28 Sylvie Bonny, “Why are most Europeans opposed to GMOs? Factors explaining rejection in France and Europe,” 
Electronic Journal of Biotechnology 6, no. 1, (April 15, 2003). 
Ouest France, “Sondage. Les OGM inquietent de plus en plus les Francais,” Ouest France, September 27, 2013, 
https://www.ouest-france.fr/europe/france/sondage-les-ogm-inquietent-de-plus-en-plus-les-francais-420229. 
"Eurobarometer, Biotechnology – Report," European Parliament Eurobarometer Survey, 
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29 “Democracy on the Move,” European Parliament Eurobarometer Survey, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2018/oneyearbefore2019/eb89_one_year_before_2019_eur




“labelling and traceability requirements” of products that contain GM material, and third “[closing] 
the European market de facto to GM foods.”30 Though the most intense opposition to GMO is 
concentrated in and has access to political power in only a few Member States, these elements 
have enjoyed critical levels of influence at the EU level compared to other large interest groups in 
the European Union: the latitude conferred to member states in the areas of health and safety and 
possible implications for disruption to the Common Market have resulted in the Commission  
agreeing to “stricter standards and procedures than they otherwise would have preferred.”31 
Further, Kurzer and Cooper cite the outreach efforts of trans-national actors, namely Greenpeace, 
at coordinating continent-wide messaging while also articulating anti-GMO messages to the 
unique cultural and economic circumstances of each Member State, for example appealing to rural 
and local traditions of cultivation and farming lifestyle.32 Finally, as discussed above, the anti-
biotech coalition’s views on Professor Anne Glover were widely seen as pivotal in her dismissal 
as Chief Science Advisor. 
 
 
The Scientific Community 
 
The scientific community in the European Union operates differently than the Anti-Biotech 
Coalition. Primarily, Scientists are often much more reluctant than other groups to engage in public 
advocacy and coalition-building in the political sense.33 Nevertheless, as a de facto coalition, they 
do engage in adaptation, taking stands and adapting messaging when opposing coalitions become 
“too important to ignore.” On the GMO issue, as the Anti-GMO coalition and its messages have 
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grown to majority acceptance within the European Union, the Scientific Community has become 
increasingly vocal in its position on GMOs.  
For example, the European Academies Science Advisory Council, a body representing, and 
funded by, the national science academies of 27 European countries, has recently expressed strong 
opinions on the need for changes in what it views as regressive GMO regulation. In 2014, in the 
midst of a debate on the reform that would allow EU Member States to opt out of GMO cultivation 
on their territories, the EASAC issued a summary stating that “Compared with other regions of 
the world, the EU has fallen behind in its adoption of crop plant genetic modification and one of 
the reasons for this has been the time-consuming and expensive regulatory framework, 
compounded by politicisation of decision-making by Member States. Many in the scientific 
community are concerned that this situation will worsen.” 34  Indeed, when in late 2018 the 
European Court of Justice ruled that new gene modification technologies must be classified 
according to decade-old GMO regulations, the Chief Science Advisors of the European 
Commission issued a rare rebuttal, noting that “there is danger that unless the EU improves the 
regulatory environment for products of gene-editing, it will be left behind in this field, which could 
also diminish EU influence on ongoing debates at the international level with respect to specific 
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Of note as well is the EC’s usage of the Precautionary Principle, which although conceived 
as a mechanism to prioritize public protection and safety in the minds of regulators, remains “an 
abstract legal principle that is implemented through policy making, and, as such, it can produce 
different policy responses.”36 This standard is defined in numerous ways, though in principle 
places the onus on new technologies to prove themselves safe rather than placing the onus on 
regulators to prove them unsafe. However, the Commission left the principle officially undefined, 
an oversight which would in many respects set the stage for the current debate over regulation of 
GMOs.37 For example, in 2000 EC published a communication to bring the precautionary principle 
line with WTO standards since it was previously “ill-defined,ad hoc and, to a certain extent, 
nonscientific application of the precautionary principle.”38 
The precautionary principle is generally agreed to have arisen in the 1970s in West German 
environmental policy and began to be incorporated into various international agreements and 
environmental laws in the 1980s. In 1990s the principle gained general worldwide acceptance, 
being included in agreements by the UN and the EU.39 In 1998, 35 scientists and policymakers 
from the US and Europe attended the Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle, in 
which the principle was defined as “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships 
are not fully established scientifically” 40  In the US, in stark contrast, “uncertainty is used 
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strategically by the regulated community as reason to justify inaction …lacking such data, 
substances are deemed safe simply by default (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
1998)…Many laws in the U.S. assume potentially harmful activities safe by default and require 
near proof of damage before government agencies can act.”41 
However, the Precautionary Principle has long been seen as at risk for politicization to slow 
innovation and science when they were deemed politically unwanted; “the precautionary principle 
has often been portrayed as contrary to the tenets of sound science and inconsistent with the norms 
of ‘science-based’ decision making.”42 Even before the Juncker administration, the commission 
showed clear signs of sociopoliticization of the Precautionary Principle and regulatory 
decisionmaking more generally, for “Although the Commission, in principle, favours cost-benefit 
analysis, it argues that it should not only consider the costs to the ‘Community’ as a whole but also 
to a number of non-economic considerations such as public acceptability, leaving the Commission 
plenty of vague language for interpretation.”43 Finally, the EC may use the Precautionary Principle 
“to legitimise decisions that are irrational,” which shall be further evidenced below.44 
In a preliminary European Court of Justice ruling on EU GMO regulation 1829/2003, the 
Precautionary Principle was defined to imply that in certain circumstances as long as “scientific 
uncertainty persists, provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of 
health protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific information 
for a more comprehensive risk assessment.” 45  Nevertheless, observers note that the official 
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definitions are one thing, and applications are quite another; Lofstedt (2014) notes that “regulators 
and policy makers are consistently misusing the precautionary principle and the European courts 
have not been systematic in their interpretations of it.”46  Though scientific uncertainty can never 
be fully eliminated, in effect this definition implies that until the safety of a new technology is 
sufficiently established, regulators may prevent its propagation in the name of the protection of 
public health. As Skogstad (2011) puts it, “Analysts characterize the EU political culture of GMO 
regulation as a precautionary one whose epistemological underpinnings are skepticism about the 
capacity of science to know and assess the risks of this novel technology and, understandably 
therefore, less willingness to grant scientific experts exclusive authority in risk regulation.”47 In 
one sense, this regulatory perspective is left with important ambiguities: who is to decide what 
constitutes “scientific uncertainty”? What is a sufficiently comprehensive risk assessment? What 
degree of restriction constitutes the “measures necessary to ensure…health protection”? These are 
indeed important questions that to some extent remain open to interpretation and contestation. In 
practice, however, the Precautionary Principle can be reduced to a simple motto: the burden of 
proof rests upon those who claim safety. But just as in US regulatory rules the burden of proof 
rests roughly on harm and yet thousands of substances are not permissible in foods, in turn so does 
the burden of proof resting on safety not prevent the approval of new foods. 
 
Participatory Technology Assessments 
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A further key term in the regulatory toolkit, Participatory Technology Assessment, is a 
concept that has existed since 1980. Beginning in the mid-1980s, several science-related crises – 
Chernobyl (1986), Bhopal (1984), Mad Cow (1980s) and Dioxins (1999) – triggered and sustained 
increasing public skepticism in the effectiveness and legitimacy of regulatory procedures.48 In 
European regulatory circles this has led to a demand for greater public participation in such 
regulatory processes, discussed in greater detail below. “Since the mid-1990s, following a series 
of food-related scares and debates, with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and 
genetically modified (GM) foods as the most prominent issues, food safety institutions in Europe 
have been facing growing demands for a more effective, efficient and, at the same time, balanced 
and fair regulatory process that is also characterised by more transparent and participatory 
decision-making procedures.”49 The concept of Participatory Technology Assessment (henceforth 
“PTA”50) is the process of involving various constituent viewpoints outside of the scientific 
community into the process of determining the potential impacts of new technologies. For 
example, in 1996 the Danish government attempted to evaluate new plans for ensuring a clean 
supply of drinking water; five industry and stakeholder groups each presented its plan before a 
panel of 60 subject matter experts, 60 politicians, and 60 randomly selected citizens, all ultimately 
casting votes regarding the 5 plans.51  
Such a model represents a stark contrast to a more technocratic system in which the plans 
would be decided between merely politicians and experts, or perhaps drafted only amongst 
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regulatory or industry experts and submitted to politicians, who could choose whether to present 
it to their constituents, for approval. In contrast to US regulatory agencies, this represents an high 
level of layman participation. The US Food and Drug Administration, for example, makes 
extensive use of Advisory Committees, composed of “qualified experts” as well as nominated, 
vetted “consumer representatives” who must be able to “analyze scientific data, understand 
research design, discuss benefits and risks, and evaluate the safety and efficacy of products under 
review,” a significant contrast to the randomly selected and broad-based participants in some 
European PTAs.52 In some European cases, no experts are involved in the PTA panel, such as the 
1997 Baden conference on ozone in which the “panel consisted of young people aged 18-26 only. 
The panelists were instructed by written material and during two preparatory weekends with 
several weeks interval. During the weekends, no experts were heard” [sic]. 53  It may merit 
consideration in which situations each approach may be preferable to the other, and a worthy topic 
for future research. 
PTA was first codified as an assessment and regulatory mechanism in the 1980s and has 
grown to see widespread use throughout Europe.54 A large body of research and meta-research, 
sponsored or commissioned by EU funding and coordination mechanisms and listed on the EU 
Commission’s website (specifically, its CORDIS database), makes use of PTA or studies its use.55 
Most notably, the 2000 European PTA review, known by its abbreviation EUROPTA, was carried 
out  
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“to advance the understanding of the role of PTA by critically assessing the 
experiences to date of different European national participatory initiatives, to 
identify criteria for the practical implementation of participatory methods, and to 
contribute to the development of participatory methods and practices in technology 
assessment”  
 
and further, a principal objective of the assessment was to “make recommendations about the use 
of PTA at a national as well as a (European) transnational level.”56 A 2008 European Parliament 
study was undertaken “to ensure successful pan-European PTA cooperation.”57 The Logic of PTA 
has thus permeated many aspects of EU decisionmaking. 
A Brief History of GMO Policy 
 
The late 1990s were a landmark period in GMO policy in the European Union. Though 
other institutions (such as the EU Council) can decide on political priorities, and the European 
Parliament must ultimately approve new legislation, the European Commission and its subsidiary 
agencies (such as the European Food Safety Authority) and committees are tasked with 
interpretation and enforcement of regulations; Furthermore, the Commission must originate all 
proposed legislation 58. The EU Council is formed by the Heads of State of European Member 
States, and thus gives political will and direction to the European Union, but lacks administrative 
oversight authority. This separation of powers, as outlined in the EU’s foundational treaties, has 
been the source of ongoing tension and frustration on the GMO issue. 59  The Commission’s 
“Directive 90/220/EEC…covered the development of GM crops and the placing on the market of 
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live GMOs such as fruit, seeds, and other products” However, the legislation did not regulate 
“processed products containing GMOs.”60 In 1996, the “GMO crisis” began in the UK with the 
launch of a “tomato puree containing GM tomatoes” which stoked consumer ire and was branded 
as a “frankenfood.” 61  Following on the heels of the tomato puree dispute, the European 
Commission passed Regulation (EC) No. 258/9, which required “compulsory labeling for all 
products containing GM ingredients placed on the market on or after May 16, 1997.” A key word 
in this regulation is “novel,” as “ingredients that had been authorized for use before May 15, 1997” 
were grandfathered into approval, which included several “roundup-ready” varietals of Soy and 
Corn.62 Additionally, the regulation “does not apply to additives or flavorings.” These loopholes 
were patched in the following year with 1139/98/EE, which retroactively and proactively regulated 
any products in which genetically modified DNA or Proteins could be detected; in other words, if 
it was possible to tell from analyzing the end products that they arose from a genetically modified 
source, they were unauthorized.63 
 
The 1997 Dispute 
 
A contest in 1997 between the regulatory authority of the Commission and those of 
member states culminated in a standoff that still colors the discussion of GMO regulations to this 
day. “In 1997, the Commission’s decision power led to a first confrontation with the Council over 
Bt 176 maize. Neither the comitology committee nor the Council succeeded in reaching a qualified 
majority and the Commission ultimately approved a GM maize for sale despite the fact that only 
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one Member State supported its approval.”64 This move led the governments of Austria, Italy and 
Luxembourg to ban the cultivation of the maize outright, which the Commission considered an 
illegal contravention of the Single Market principle, and consequently required the bans be lifted. 
The culmination of this dispute was that “In June 1999 Member States in the Environment Council 
announced that they would not authorize any new GM products until existing procedures were 
reformed.”65 12 of the then 15 Member States agreed not to authorize new GMOs, resulting in a 
de facto moratorium.66  
Recent Development 
 
The EU’s current policy on GMOs can be traced to 2010 with the proposal to grant the 
Member States authority over the cultivation of GMOs in their territory, a policy “described as 
‘renationalization’ of prerogatives previously exercised at the European level.”67 Randour (2014) 
analyzes the 2010 devolution of regulatory authority from a multi-level governance framework, 
arguing that the interplay of Subnational Resistance (environmental groups, namely the GMO-free 
Regions Network), the European Parliament (Green MEPs who accepted the devolution as a 
compromise), The EU Council (only 6 member states have GM crops on their territories) , and 
looming pressure from the WTO (in May 2003 several countries including the United States 
initiated a trade dispute regarding the de facto moratorium on new biotechnology) forced a 
reckoning. Caught between the rock of external trade pressure and the hard place of intransigent 
member states, the Commission chose to surrender some authority and devolve power to 
members– indeed, resolving the problem by avoiding it and placing the regulatory onus on national 
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governments.68 Randour observes that several factors indicate that the EU conducted this multi-
level balancing act: “first, the proposal tried to avoid breaching WTO rules by not altering the 
science-based assessments and the authorization process…second, the arguments to be used under 
the ‘new’ opt-out clause are to be entirely separated from environmental and health concerns” 
which demonstrates deference to political pressures, and “third, this compromise specifically aims 
to…ensure the functioning of the internal market” (1318). Randour poses the question of why the 
EU would voluntarily devolve this authority to Member States despite the above evidenced history 
of seeking generally to maximize authority over a wide range of issues, clearly including policies 
on science and technical regulation, and much of Randour’s analysis remains valid for 
understanding criticisms of the current 2017-2018 comitological reform proposal. 
Devolution was not the only option available to the Commission, however, as many 
countries do use WTO obligations as weapons in a fight for internal reform, and a threat of a 
victory for retaliatory sanctions from the United States may have proven an effective bludgeon 
against internal prohibitions on GMO cultivation. As Skogstad  observes, “EU policies…have 
been under attack for some time both within the EU and outside, from EU trading partners and 
fellow WTO members like the US.”69 Skogstad continues: “Both internal and external criticisms 
fault the failure of the EU GMO regulatory regime to conform to ‘rendering account’ 
standards…The ascendant precautionary EU political culture of risk regulation, emphasizing the 
uncertainty of GMO risks and sceptical of scientists’ capacity to assess GMO risks, is reluctant to 
delegate regulatory authority to scientific experts and measures the accountability of EU decision-
makers against democratic principles of popular control.” 
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The question of why the political culture is reluctant to side with scientific experts over 
democratic principles is one that is explored further, but one possible answer lies in the desire to 
address the “democratic deficit” - explored in greater depth in Chapter III, but generally referring 
to the perceived lack of democratic input into the decisionmaking processes of EU institutions, 
particularly as those decisions are moved “higher” into EU institutions and away from the people 
or their national governments. While legislative processes may represent a model of what Skogstad 
calls a “shared political authority” that rests on democratic processes, the “implementation of these 
same regulations by comitology procedures” – using internal Commission mechanisms to avoid 
relying on Member State input –  is an element of a “delegated” form of authority not 
democratically exercised by individual states but rather by the body they delegate to exercise them 
(i.e. the Commission).70 However, “The EU” is not a unitary actor, and as a nominally democratic 
institution the member states and representatives that compose decisionmaking bodies are bound 
to some extent, at least in norms, by the desires of Member State governments – the majority of 
whom desired the ability to prohibit GMO cultivation, but some of which represented countries 
with sizeable biotech industries that would be devastated by an EU-wide ban. Given such 
circumstances, there may have been little room for maneuvering. 
Nevertheless, the policy of devolution or “renationalization” represents a divergence from 
standard operating procedure in many policy areas: “Although comitology rules permit a qualified 
majority of Member States to prevail over a dissenting minority of states, in practice 
representatives of Member States in committees and the Council work toward consensus-building” 
– GMO policy thus represents a particularly intractable area of EU policy that defies established 
                                                          




norms of consensus-seeking behavior of member states.71 Rather, the GMO issue seems to play 




Four Commission directives that have been produced in the past 20 years form the pillars 
of the European stance on GMOs. “This package of reforms can be read as an effort to strengthen 
both democratic (participation) accountability standards of popular control as well as delegated 
fiduciary-based principles of performance accountability.”72 
1. Directive 2001/18, the Deliberate Release Directive. Its objective is to ensure the 
environmental safety of ‘live’ GMOs, like GM maize kernels or rapeseed. Like Directive 
90/220 which it replaced in April 2001, Directive 2001/18 requires a risk assessment of 
every GMO before it is released into the environment. 
2. Regulation 1829/2003, the Food and Feed Regulation (Commission, 2003a), which 
replaced the 1997 Novel Food Directive. Its regulatory procedures are designed to ensure 
the human and animal health and safety of any GM food and feed, and processed food 
made from GMOs (like cornstarch) that are marketed in the EU. 
3. Third is Regulation 1830/2003 on the labelling and traceability of GMOs and food and 
feed produced from GMOs (Commission, 2003b). Labelling is intended to ensure 
consumer choice, and traceability provisions are intended to track and recall GM products 
in the event of a safety issue. 
4. The fourth pillar in the EU GMO regulatory framework is not specific to GM products. It 
is Regulation 178/2002 which laid out European food law and the role of EFSA 
(Commission, 2002). Since it began operations in 2003as a permanent body dispensing 
advice to the Commission on food safety issues (and GMOs’ risks), EFSA has replaced 
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Regulation requires striking a balance between different competing drawbacks and 
benefits, often resulting in dilemmas for regulators. In the classic formulation, this balancing act 
occurs between the priorities of economic competitiveness on the one hand and environmental and 
health protection on the other.74 A classic case in recent years, for example, would be the choice 
of whether to require companies to install carbon dioxide scrubbers on exhaust ports even if those 
scrubbers are expensive and would cut into the companies’ bottom line. Löfstedt (2004) notes that 
EU regulation tends to behave like a pendulum, swinging between the technocratic and democratic 
extremes.75 What Löfstedt identified as the driving force behind the movement between these two 
extremes is the changing balance of priorities among “competitiveness, sustainable development, 
and governance,” which Löfstedt identifies with the Commission’s aim of creating “better 
regulation” to satisfy all three. This is a different take than the classic regulatory dilemma 
(protection versus competitiveness) as noted above by Kapstein. It also differs from the “regulatory 
trilemma” (protection, competitiveness, and EU integration) proposed by Smith – in this latter 
formulation, the classic concerns of balancing competitiveness and protection are met with the 
third priority of harmonizing European economic and regulatory integration, creating an even more 
difficult equation to solve than the relatively simple problem of balancing protection and 
competitiveness.76 Löfstedt and Smith thus both gravitate toward a trilemma, the difference here 
being the substitution of “protection” for “sustainable development” and “EU integration” for 
“governance.” For the analysis in this paper, Smith’s regulatory trilemma – Protection, 
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Competitiveness, EU Integration – seems to most closely describe the facts at work in EU GMO 
regulations. 
Further, though, this study proposes that alongside the dimensions of the above di- and 
trilemmas, when public opinion diverges significantly from scientific opinion, there is an entirely 
different dimension of concerns, priorities, and interests that must be balanced: public legitimacy 
on the one hand and scientific and policy expertise on the other – a Schumpterian Public Choice 
dilemma. Under the leadership of Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission has been 
pursuing a package of reforms that make decisive choices in both dimensions of regulatory 
decisionmaking – not only strongly pursing public legitimacy over the recommendations of the 
scientific community, but also pursuing a conception of environmental protection at the expense 
of both economic competitiveness and the integrity of the European Union. Though Juncker may 
be pursuing these reforms out of combination of a genuine concern for the safety of GMOs and 
genuine attempt to respect popular opinion and address the democratic deficit, the potential 
nobility and necessity of these causes does not exempt the reforms from consequences in 








The Proposed Reforms 
 
The Juncker Commission’s attempts to respond to both personal and popular opinions on 
the nature of Genetically Modified Foods have taken two main forms: first, a proposed law that 
would have allowed EU Member States to opt of out of allowing Genetically Modified Food 
products to be sold on their territories, and second, a proposed comitological reform that would 
allow member states who hold a simple majority, but not a qualified majority (55% of voting 
Member States representing 65% of the EU population), to decide whether to approve or reject the 
authorization of a new GMO.77 Both of these proposed reforms, as shall be seen, would have 
serious negative consequences for European institutions and citizens. Further, when combined 
with recent European moves that weaken the influence of scientists and health experts in 
determining GMO policy, these moves constitute a minimization of scientific input within the 
workings of EU regulatory policy that could have long-term effects.   
 The European Food Safety Authority, for example, states in its self-description that it bases 
decisions on “science-based advice and clear communication grounded in the most up-to-date 
scientific information and knowledge,” and in its food law general principles stresses that “food 
law, and in particular measures relating to food safety must be underpinned by strong science,” 
and further “Risk assessment must be undertaken in an independent, objective and transparent 
manner based on the best available science” [emphasis in original].78 However, the role of the 
EFSA in any inconsistencies is attenuated by the fact that “EFSA does not authorise GMOs, which 
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is done by the European Commission and Member States in their role as risk managers. EFSA’s 




The primary manifestation of the EU’s attitudes and policy on GMOs is the authorization 
procedure by which GMOs are allowed or denied entry into cultivation or sale in the European 
Union. As the EU’s policies have evolved, so too have the rules about how authorization is gained 
and which allowances and prohibitions are subject to EU regulatory assent. “According to 
Directive 90/220/EEC, the authorization of GMOs is decided through comitology – more 
particularly through a so-called ‘regulatory procedure’ in the (pre-Lisbon) comitology terminology 
(see Blom-Hansen, 2011). The Directive indeed delegates the power to decide on individual 
applications of GMO producers for the authorization of a particular GM crop to the Commission, 
which must work with Member State representatives gathered in a comitology committee.”80 To 
resolve the issue of, as the Juncker Administation sees it, too many GMOs being authorized over 
the democratic objections of European consumers, the Commission has proposed a reform to the 
comitological procedures by which such GMOs are accepted or rejected.  
The EU process for the authorization of a genetically modified organism requires a series 
of approvals from various levels of EU decision-making bodies. In the EU legal framework, which 
enshrines the Precautionary Principle as the cornerstone of regulation, the burden of proof lies on 
safety, not on harm – “every authorization for placing a product on the market must be duly 
justified, and the main ground on which such a justification can rely is scientific assessment,” 
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responsibility for which is delegated to the EFSA. “From a legal point of view, decisions to 
authorise GMOs take the form of implementing acts adopted by the Commission.” At multiple 
stages in the procedure, member states must vote on the acts and reach a qualified majority. “Whilst 
the commission therefore plays a decisive role in the authorization process, Member States are 
also very much involved.” Since the implementation of Regulation EC 1829/2003, “member states 
have never obtained a qualified majority,” and thus all such deliberations have resulted in “no 
opinion” – therefore, a lack of authorization.  
“The 1829/2003 Food and Feed Regulation, which amends the 2001 Directive, 
provides the Member States with an alternative to restrict GM crops: co-
existence measures. As Dobbs (2011, p. 181) argues, these co-existence 
measures are ‘a crucial provision for the states and the central compromise to 
encourage the lifting of nation outright bans and the de facto moratorium’. In 
other words, the 2001 Directive strengthens the conditions to restrict GMOs’ 
under the safeguard clause and it gives more flexibility to the Member States by 
granting them the possibility to define ‘appropriate measures’ to achieve a 
separation between GM and non-GM crops.”81  
That is to say, although comitological rules have not led to member states outright rejecting the 
approval of GMOs, member states could determine internally what safeguard procedures were 
necessary to prevent the contamination of non-GM crops by GM pollen, runoff, and seeds. By 
imposing wide berths around existing non-GM cultivation, for example, countries could 
effectively impose significant restrictions on cultivation within their territories.  
According to the infographic “GMOs: EU decision-making process explained,” a biotech 
entity wishing to attain authorization for a GM product applies to a member state who then requests 
a risk assessment from the EFSA.82 The EFSA then delivers its opinion to the EU commission, 
which is commented on by the member states experts committee, which can adopt or not adopt 
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outright. When there is no opinion, the matter is again referred to the EU commission which sends 
the matter to an appeals committee. The appeals committee can adopt or reject outright, but a 
decision of “no opinion” leads to direct adoption by the commission. 
However – and this is the crux of the comitological issue – the workaround established to 
placate anti-GMO member states has proven a double-edged sword.  The Regulation EU No 
182/2011 was conceived to grant member states more opportunities to voice concerns on GMO 
authorization and to create “mechanisms   for   control   by   Member   States   of   the   
Commission’s   exercise   of   implementing   powers.”83 The procedure allows, in situations in 
which “no opinion” is registered in the comitological proceedings, for the Commission to adopt 
the draft implementation. However, for products for which authorization is required before entry 
to market (such as GMOs), “the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the case-law of the Court of 
Justice, requires the Commission to adopt a decision.” 84  Products cannot, therefore, simply 
“default” into authorization or non-authorization when the commission reaches a decision of “no 
opinion”; rather, the Commission is forced by current comitological proceedings to expressly 
approve the authorization. As Skogstad puts it, “if that compromise cannot be found, decision-
making rules require the Commission to exercise its delegated powers as a fiduciary and approve 
the proposal it initiated.” 85  This requirement for the Commission to overtly approve GMO 
applications when the committee becomes deadlocked is the core of the comitological reform 
proposal put forth by the Juncker Commission. As stated in President Juncker’s Political 
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Guidelines, “I will make sure that the procedural rules governing the various authorisations for 
GMOs are reviewed. I would not want the Commission to be able to take a decision when a 
majority of Member States has not encouraged it to do so. In general, let us avoid ideological 
debates which only sow division”86. 
To complicate matters, the enormous regulatory latitude by which member states could de 
facto control the cultivation of GM crops on their territories was given a de jure foundation in 
2015, with the Adoption of Directive (EU) 2015/412. This directive allows member states to opt 
out of the cultivation of GMOs on their territory given “that such measures are justified on the 
basis of compelling reasons other than the risk to human or animal health and the environment,” 
which fall under the purview of the EFSA risk assessment. This system has two notable gaps: first, 
this directive works in only one direction: member states can restrict cultivation that the EU 
authorizes, but cannot allow cultivation that the EU does not authorize. Second, this directive only 
applies to cultivation, and not to GMOs introduced into food and feed directly. “The issues raised 
by Member States who have opposed authorisations are most often not based on scientific 
considerations, but reflect national concerns which do not only relate to issues associated with the 
safety of GMOs for health or the environment.” 87 
In 2015, the Commission proposed another regulatory reform that is also considered 
alongside the comitological reform as part of a joint thrust by the Juncker Commission to reduce 
or eliminate the authorization of GMOs in the EU. In line with the goals of the Better Regulation 
initiative, the Commission submitted proposed legislation to the EU Parliament “to restrict or 
prohibit the use of genetically modified food and feed on their territory,” “even though these crops 
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were approved at the EU level following a rigorous scientific assessment.”88 In the September 
2015 State of the Union, President Juncker stated that “European  problems  require  European  
solutions, national  problems  require  national  solutions.  In respect  of  this  principle,  and  
because  citizens' concerns about Genetically Modified Organisms may   vary   greatly   among   
Member   States,   the Commission  has  proposed  to  return  the  power  to restrict  or  prohibit  
the  use  Genetically  Modified food and feed to national authorities.”89 This statement evidences 
a line of thinking in the Juncker administration that is placing high emphasis on the need to 
improve the democratic legitimacy of European regulatory processes in order to address a 
democratic deficit. However, the result demonstrates some of the unintended consequences of such 
a prioritization. In the weeks leading up to the Parliament’s October vote on the proposal, nineteen 
European countries submitted requests for the proposed opt-outs, allowing them to roll back 
common market obligations to treat all EU products equally, and to instead prevent the import or 
commercialization of GMOs. 90  In many of these cases, a political rather than a scientific 
motivation was overt: “without a trace of embarrassment, a spokeswoman for Nicola Sturgeon, the 
leader of the Scottish National Party, admitted that the first minister’s science adviser had not been 
consulted because the decision [to opt out and prevent GMO cultivation] ‘wasn’t based on 
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scientific evidence.’ Instead, the priority was to protect the ‘clean green image’ of the country’s 
produce, according to the secretary for rural affairs, food and environment.”91 
 The Juncker Commission argued that this proposed reform was the logical extension of the 
decision allowing the prevention of cultivation. “The Commission suggested that this proposal 
should be modelled on another EU law, on GMOs intended for cultivation, which entered into 
force in early April 2015. This allows member states to ban the cultivation of EU-approved GMOs 
on their territory.” 92 The EU Parliament, however, did not consent to the proposed measures. 
Rather, “A large majority in European Parliament has voted to reject a European Commission 
proposal that would enable member states to opt out of EU authorisations for genetically modified 
food,” with one MEP having “never seen so much consensus.”93 In a different situation, this 
struggle over GMO policy would be run-of-the-mill political disagreement between the EU 
Commission and EU Parliament. However, given that it represents a fundamental debate between 
the scientific community and the EU commission, with the Commission going so far as to abolish 
a science advisor position based on personal political differences of opinion on the matter, this 
proposed and failed reform legislation forms part of a larger pattern of anti-GMO proposals that 
threaten the efficacy of EU institutions and call into question the “sound science” upon which EU 
regulatory decisionmaking is nominally based. 
2017 – The Venting of Frustrations 
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Several events in rapid-fire succession in early 2017 serve to demonstrate the growing frustrations 
of the Juncker Commission and like-minded Commissioners about the institutional and 
comitological inability to more tightly regulate GMOs, and serve as a further background for the 
push to resolve the resulting institutional tensions. The frustrations resulted in the Juncker 
Commission promulgating a new comitological reform proposal in late 2017 in explicit response 
to the comitological difficulties illustrated below. 
 
27 January 2017 Committee Meeting 
 
In the 27 January 2017 meeting of the EU Commission Standing Committee on Plants, 
Animals, Food and Feed (PAFF), Committee on Genetically Modified Food and Feed and 
Environmental Risk, the Committee voted “no opinion” on the authorization of two strains of 
GMO Maize: Bt11 (SYN-BTØ11-1), Bt11 × 59122 × MIR604 × 1507 × GA21, and 1507 (DAS-
Ø15Ø7-1). The exact vote totals of these committee meetings are not released publicly (a point 
specifically targeted for reform by the Juncker administration’s proposed reform package). 
Member states can voluntarily lodge individual opinions, however, and on both cases the 
representative from Sweden lodged a written statement, arguing that “glufosinate ammonium [the 
pesticide against which the GM traits in both crops provide protections] is a pesticide so dangerous 
that Sweden must vote NO in order to continue to work towards a non-toxic environment in the 
EU.”94 The Czech Republic took a less uniform standpoint on the proposals, having abstained on 
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the votes of Bt11 and 1507 but agreeing to the approval of another GM product up for approval at 
the same meeting: “Regarding the voting of the Czech Republic … the positions differed due to 
lack of consensus among the Competent Authorities at this stage. Therefore the Czech Republic 
voted in favour in the case of MON810 (under Regulation 1829/2003) and abstained as regards 
GM maizes 1507 and Bt11 (under Directive 2001/18/EC).”95 
 
 
Comitology Reform Proposal 
 
On 14 February 2017, barely 2 weeks after the above votes, the EU Commission proposed 
a Comitology Procedural Reform. In this proposal, the Commission specifically criticized the 
inability to prevent GMO authorizations with a simple majority: “In specific policy areas, such as 
GMO authorisations, or if a simple majority of Member States is against the draft act, the 
Commission cannot go ahead with adoption when the Committee reaches a 'no opinion' 
situation.”96 This contrasts with the line from the same statement that “The overall system works 
very well and should be maintained” – if the system is generally working well, is the hitch of GMO 
regulation sufficient to merit changing the otherwise well-functioning system? Rather, possibly, 
this proposal cuts directly to the issue of GMOs as the perennial bugbear of the Juncker 
Commission; Jean-Claude Juncker has quite clearly intended to enact similar reforms for at least 
two years: “As President Juncker said in his State of the Union address in 2016, "It is not right 
that when EU countries cannot decide among themselves whether or not to ban the use of 
glyphosate in herbicides, the Commission is forced by Parliament and Council to take a decision. 
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So we will change those rules.” Once more, this statement evidences a high degree of emphasis 
placed on subsidiarity, devolution, and increasing the perceptions of democratic legitimacy of 
regulatory decisionmaking, in an attempt to address the democratic deficit. 
The exact nature of the proposed reforms merits further elaboration. This is not a case, like 
in the US, where a product is considered safe “by default.” Currently, in a ‘no opinion’ scenario, 
there is still one very significant hurdle that proposed GMOs must face: the EFSA safety report. 
As it stands, in the case where member states cannot come to an agreement under the current 
comitology rules, the decision is not to default to approval – the decision is instead devolved to 
the findings of the EFSA. This may be a system of primarily political institutions, but one which 
defaults to technocratic one when a qualified majority cannot be reached and the mechanisms of 
political decision are stuck. 
The administration wishes to reform comitological procedures along the following lines97: 
• changing the voting rules in the Appeal Committee, so that only votes in favour or against 
an act are taken into account [i.e. not counting absentions]. 
• involving national Ministers by allowing the Commission to make a second referral to 
the Appeal Committee at Ministerial level if national experts do not take a position … this 
will ensure that sensitive decisions are discussed at the appropriate political level;  
• increasing voting transparency at the Appeal Committee level by making public the 
votes of Member State representatives;  
• ensuring political input by enabling the Commission to refer the matter to the Council of 
Ministers for an Opinion if the Appeal Committee is unable to take a position. 
 
The proposal drew vociferous responses from many different groups, not only partisans of 
the GMO debate. The Biotechnology Innovation Organization, an industry trade group, naturally 
claimed that the “EU’s Anti-Science Comitology Reform Threatens Innovation” and that even the 
current procedure “allows politics to undermine the risk assessment function of the European Food 
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Safety Authority”98. Euractiv, an organization in favor of increased European integration, took a 
very different tack and criticized the move on the grounds that it weakened centralized EU 
decisionmaking authority, noting that the reform “attempts to return to the pre-Lisbon Treaty 
system, without getting there…it is doomed to failure before any talks have begun”99 As of this 
writing, no movement has been made on this proposed reform measure. 
 
27 March 2017 Appeals Committee Meeting 
 
On 27 March, the Appeal Committee of the Genetically Modified Food and Feed 
Regulatory Committee met in Brussels to discuss the “no opinion” decision reached by the 
Committee in January.100 The reasons given for negative votes or abstentions were broadly similar 
for the two crops but with some notable differences: 
Reasons for negative vote or 
abstention for the authorization of 
Bt11 
 Reasons for negative vote or 
abstention for the authorization of 
1507 
• No agreed national position 
• Negative public opinion 
• Political reasons  
• Risk of harm to the national agri-food 
industry 
• Lack of comprehensive data on long-
term potential impact of GMOs  
• Precautionary principle 
• Uncertainties in risk assessment 
• Safety concerns for the environment 
 • No agreed national position 
• Negative public opinion 
• Political reasons 
• Risk of harm to the national agri-food 
industry 
• Lack of comprehensive data on long-
term potential impact of GMOs 
• Precautionary principle 
• Risk assessment deemed not sufficient 
• National GM-free strategy  
• EFSA minority opinion 
• Lack of long-term feeding studies  
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• Potential risks for the environment 
and health due to tolerance of maize 
Bt11 to glufosinate ammonium  
 
Again for both votes, the representative from Sweden chose to lodge individual statements, once 
again nearly identical to each other and nearly identical to the statements in the original committee 
meeting: 
“The Swedish government is of the view that an holistic approach to the use of the 
substance is important. The political assessment is that glufosinate-ammonium is 
such a toxic pesticide that a NO-vote is warranted in order to contribute to an Union 
strategy for a non-toxic environment in the European Union.” 
 
The breakdown of votes was perhaps as predictable as it was inevitable. On both the Bt11 and 
1507 strains of genetically modified maize, the appeals committee once again reached the result 
of “no opinion.”  Groups opposed to GMOs expressed unhappiness at the results of the meeting. 
"When he was elected, Commission President Juncker promised more democratic decision-
making. This vote leaves no doubt that approving these GMO crops would break that promise,” 
and “A majority of governments, parliamentarians and Europeans oppose them, and two thirds of 
European countries ban GMO cultivation on their lands.”101 
 
July Approval Announcement 
 
The European Commission regularly releases news briefings detailing significant activities 
throughout the day. Two announcements in 2017 refer to the approval processes of the GMOs in 
question. On 4 July 2017, the commission announced the approval of “maize Bt11 × 59122 × 
MIR604 × 1507 × GA21” and “maize DAS-40278-9”; the announcement stated, in relatively 
                                                          





simple terms, that “These GMOs had received "no opinion" votes from the Member States in both 
the Standing and Appeal Committees and the Commission adopted the pending decisions.”102 This 
announcement is of little note on its own. Of significance, however, is the change that transpired 
between the 4 July announcement and the release on 22 December 2017 announcing the “renewal 
of maize 1507” among some others. “These GMOs had received "no opinion" votes from the 
Member States both in the Standing and the Appeal Committees and the Commission therefore 
had to adopt the pending decisions” (emphasis added).103 While the phrase “had to” may not be 
forceful in itself, when paired with the ongoing context of Jean Claude Juncker’s personal and 
professional frustrations with the EU comitology process and the inability to stop the approval of 
GMOs, to which Mr. Juncker has a longstanding record of opposition,104 and when also contrasted 
with the typically dry bureaucratic nature of these announcements, the phrase is telling of growing 
impatience and a willingness to distance the mentality of the Commission from the comitological 
rules that force its hand on this issue. In a quiet room, small sounds can be large disruptions. 
The above two chapters detail the nature of the proposed reforms and the regulatory 
structure and history into which they would be implemented. However, despite having been 
proposed beginning in 2015, they have still not gained sufficient support for passage. The follow 
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The Democratic Deficit 
 
The single most pressing argument for the institution of the comitological reforms and a 
subsequent decentralization of European policy on GMO regulation is that doing so would help 
alleviate the so-called “Democratic Deficit” that has plagued Europe since before the inception of 
the European Union. Though there is, as Jensen (2009) notes in a literature review of the subject, 
a great deal of heterogeneity about the nature of or existence of Europe’s democratic deficit 
(depending on conflicting definitions of both “democratic” and “legitimacy”), ultimately “the 
European Union (EU) is widely believed to harbor a democratic deficit” of some kind.105 The 
general idea of the deficit is that European institutions are largely devoid of democratic legitimacy, 
implemented by agreements among heads of state and hidden behind several layers of bureaucratic 
abstraction from the daily practices of the civic and political life of the average European; many 
EU decisions are made by unelected ministers or representatives. 
An additional layer to the concept of the democratic deficit is the idea that the deficit grows 
the farther an institution gets from direct popular input or control – thus the unelected EU 
Commission and its regulatory agencies exhibit a greater democratic deficit than the directly 
elected EU Parliament or the national governments of Member States. One avenue of response to 
the idea of the democratic deficit is “subsidiarity” – the principle in which rules should be 
propagated at the lowest level at which they can be effective.106 For example, if a regulation can 
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be adequately administered at the level of Member States, it should be so, and not unnecessarily 
appropriated to a higher, less democratic, EU authority. 
In recent years, to the institutional tinder of the democratic deficit was added the gasoline 
of cultural populism. In the lead up to the 2016 Brexit vote, British Foreign Secretary and 
prominent “leave” proponent Michael Gove declared that the British people were “tired of 
experts,” a position that echoes the phrasing of William Easterly’s The Tyranny of Experts. 
Though writing about economic development in impoverished countries rather than in Western 
Europe, Easterly nonetheless provides a concise formulation of the problem with the “technocratic 
illusion” 107:  
By this technocratic illusion, the technical experts unintentionally confer new 
powers and legitimacy on the state as the entity that will implement the technical 
solutions. The economists who advocate the technocratic approach have a terrible 
naïveté about power—that as restraints on power are loosened or even removed, 
that same power will remain benevolent of its own accord.  
 
Easterly’s formulation articulates a view about expertise in a way that can be seen to have 
implications for Europe’s democratic deficit: if power is zero-sum, then giving power over to the 
experts, bureaucrats, and regulators (“expert cultures,” to use Habermas’s term) means taking that 
power away from the average European citizen (living in the non-expertized “life world”).108 This 
technocratic perspective, and opposition to it, were evidenced during the most frenetic period of 
the refugee crisis, when a highly formulaic Commission plan for refugee resettlement quotas (even 
incorporating formulas based on things like GDP and population) sparked populist ire for the fact 
that they seemed to ignore social, cultural, and political particularities of would-be host countries 
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– “The EU has shown itself to be limited in the face of a crisis [the refugee crisis] that revolves 
around identity concerns more than economic issues.”109 These ideas, all together, effectively 
contributed to a majority of referendum voters opting to leave the EU.110 One need hardly look 
further for proof that such anti-expert and anti-EU sentiments, left unaddressed, pose an existential 
threat to the integrity of the European Union. It cannot be taken for granted, however, that 
questions of food and GMO policy necessarily translate into an issue of EU legitimacy. What, 
exactly, is the connection between the two? 
GMOs and the Legitimacy Crisis 
 
A large body of historical data sets the precedent that there is a strong relationship between 
the GMO issue and legitimacy. First, a similar situation has arisen before, when “by the late 1990s 
the EU GMO regulatory framework had lost legitimacy.”111 At that time,  “the prevailing diagnosis 
in European policy circles was that the level of public trust in both food safety and food safety 
institutions had seriously declined and that institutional frameworks needed improving in order to 
restore public trust and social legitimacy.”112 The response was that “at the level of the European 
Union  and also in a number of EU-Member States food safety institutions were subjected to review 
and reform.”113 These reforms, in total, moved substantially away from the technocratic, expert-
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driven manner of regulatory decisionmaking to a more open model in which greater emphasis was 
given to legitimacy of process, appearance, and democratic legitimacy. During the 2000 European 
Parliament debate on EU directives for the handling of End-of-Life Vehicles, MEPs were happy 
to directly link inaction on the environmental matter to a loss of legitimacy for the body: several 
members “made the case that the EP’s reputation and rule as a protector of the environment was 
at stake.”114  
Further, Kurzer and Cooper demonstrate the direct relation between the GMO problem and 
the democratic deficit, concluding that movement on GMOs demonstrates that in some regards the 
democratic deficit is not insurmountable to collective European civil society action, but in other 
regards “comitology operates without significant input from citizens and thereby exemplifies the 
lack of popular representation and participation at the EU level.”115 
 Finally, and most directly, are the arguments of Jean-Claude Juncker himself. When, in the 
2015 Plenary Meeting on GMOs of the European Parliament, Commission President Juncker 
proposed the comitological reforms, he stated plainly the connection to the legitimacy of the EU: 
“This situation creates tensions. It is highly unsatisfactory as it contributes to a climate of distrust 
against the European Union and its Institutions” [bolding in original text].116 
To say, however, that the democratic deficit must be alleviated and therefore the 
comitological reforms must be enacted would be a leap in logic without first establishing a key 
point: why and how will these comitological reforms help assuage the democratic deficit? To 
answer that question, Jürgen Habermas provides a regulatory philosophical framework that helps 
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to make sense of this issue, providing a strong argument that democratic reforms of regulatory 
procedure may be both useful and necessary for alleviating the Democratic Deficit. 
 
Habermas’s Regulatory Frameworks 
Jürgen Habermas has, for decades, propounded a path that the European Union would need 
to follow in order to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the European populace. He summarizes the 
“political orientations that would have to stand at the beginning of the path leading to a 
democratically legitimized decision on the future of Europe”: 
• The deepening of the monetary union into a political union 
• The joining of “fiscal, budgetary, and economic policy” 
• The lessening of the “legitimacy deficit” of “all international organization founded on 
treaties between states.” This crisis of legitimacy is “exacerbated further by the fact that 
the negotiations are conducted out of the public eye.”117 
Habermas warns, “the only way that they [EU Member States] can maintain their social welfare 
model of society and the diversity of their national state cultures is through concerted action.”118 
Since these steps were promulgated in 2013, the crisis of European legitimacy, and thus the need 
for the implementation of these steps, has only deepened.119 Habermas notes that “What currently 
unite European citizens are the Eurosceptical mindsets that have become more pronounced in all 
of the member countries during the crisis.” To illuminate the European Union’s regulatory 
trajectory, Habermas provides a useful typology of different regulatory frameworks, thus laying 
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out a well-defined path towards legitimate comitology that the Juncker administration, whether 
intentionally or not, is already trying to walk.  
Deliberative Frameworks 
 
There are several frameworks for understanding the nature and impact of technology 
assessments, and regulatory policies more broadly. In his 1969 Toward a Rational Society: Student 
Protest, Science, and Politics, Habermas created a typology of regulatory regimes.120 The two 
dominant models, according to Habermas, Decisionistic and Technocratic, represent dominant 
forms found throughout the EU and in various regulatory bodies, but are broadly incompatible 
models.  
The technocratic model is one “wherein objective science is seen to directly inform policy 
making”121, and assumes a general social gravitation towards empirical truth and sees regulation 
as merely a process of factfinding. “In technocracy, science becomes the dominant institution, 
because science is believed to identify the ‘one best way’.”122 Habermas critiques this model for 
its undemocratic nature: “the reduction of political power to rational administration can be 
conceived here only at the expense of democracy itself.”123 He contrasts it with the decisionistic 
model which places emphasis on the chiefly sociopolitical choices that regulators must make based 
on policy goals. Owing some of its initial formulation to German law scholar Carl Schmitt (who 
developed decisionistic theory)124, modern decisionism emphasizes the perceptions of legitimacy 
of decisions, rather than any empirically optimal content of the decisions themselves. 
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Figure 2 – The Technocratic Model (Dryer and Renn, p. 30, from Millstone et al. 2004) 
 
 
Figure 3: The Decisionistic Model (Dryer and Renn, p. 30, from Millstone et al. 2004) 
 
 
To elaborate, “in the decisionistic model, politics defines values and goals, and science 
should deliver instrumental knowledge to achieve the goals.”125  Dreyer and Renn describe the 
decisionistic model as “less naïve” than the technocratic model in that it “recognised that policy 
making required inputs other than science in order to inform decisions, and that other legitimate 
factors (such as those relating to socio-political and economic objectives) needed to be taken into 
account in addressing risks.” However, by Habermas’s own typology, “the decisionistic model, 
however much it approximates the actual procedures of scientized politics, is inadequate according 
to its own theoretical claims,” i.e. that publicly legitimized decisions will ultimately deliver the 
greatest public good. Habermas elaborates on the critique in that as modern societies are not direct 
democracies, ultimately “decisions themselves, according to the decisionistic view, must remain 
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basically beyond public discussion” and that “democratic choice takes the form of acclamation” 
of elected officials “rather than public discussion” of the actual decisions at hand.126 As Habermas 
elaborates, “everything feared by Carl Schmitt in fact happened: the sovereign power of the king 
has been dissolved, disembodied, and dispersed in the communication flows of civil society, and 
it has at the same time assumed the shape of procedures, be it for general elections or the numerous 
deliberations and decisions of various political bodies.”127  
Nevertheless, the appearance of public input and democratic legitimacy matters. 
Increasingly, policymakers “have recognised the potential value of deliberation to a healthy 
democratic society. Two-way collaborative engagement in its various forms is considered by some 
in academic and policy circles to be a kind of ‘gold standard’ for decision-making (Felt and Fochler 
2008); and this has led to a number of key actors within these academic and policy circles to 
champion the cause of public engagement as an inherently good or fair thing to practice.”128 
Habermas also takes a very different, perhaps consequentialist, tack against Gove’s and Easterly’s 
tyranny of the “Expert” in Toward A Rational Society, arguing that “expert-driven positivism was 
used by military-industrial groups as a cloak to limit public debate and reserve decisions to an 
agenda which they dominated under the guise of technocracy” – another strong argument in favor 
of the democratization of these regulatory procedures. 
 Habermas, then, although critiquing Decisionism as having the potential for vapidness, 
nonetheless would seem to prefer it to the harmful potentials of elitist technocracy, and his 
preference for increased European integration encompasses support for increased public 
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participation and buy-in, which would most likely initially arise through decisionistic mechanisms 
– Habermas stresses the importance of democratic norms and a unified demos capable participating 
in the shared political project.129 Though Habermas proposes some of his own regulatory models 
(discussed in the conclusion), the dichotomy between technocracy and decisionism remains a 
primary axis upon which EU regulatory philosophy has moved in recent years. 
 
The EU’s Regulatory Trajectory 
When the EU began reforming its food safety laws in the 1990s to give greater emphasis 
to outward appearance and legitimacy, this move bore the hallmarks of a decisionistic model vis-
à-vis the technocratic one. 
Following the logic of principal-agent dynamics, the European Union and related 
institutions, though conceived to further the interests of individual member states, are entities with 
a vested interest in their own survival. From its inception until the early 2000s, the European 
Commission adeptly crafted and used supranational scientific institutions to expand its remit and 
cultivate a European network of scientists who could form part of a so-called “constituency for 
Europe” and thus further the public legitimacy of EU institutions. Having supported the growth of 
supranational scientific unification for the purposes of both its own political legitimacy and the 
furthering of European integration and economic competitiveness, however, has not impeded the 
EU, or specifically the European Commission, from withdrawing support from the scientific 
community when politically expedient. Institutions such as Participatory Technology Assessment 
and the EU’s particular interpretations of the Precautionary Principle, as well as funding 
requirements mandating immediate public applicability of scientific advances – all of which have 
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come over the critiques of the scientific community -  put in place substantial social and political 
barriers to European scientific advances.130 Skogstad argues that the EU regulatory regime lost 
legitimacy in the late 1990s – since that time, EU policy makers have increasingly taken on a 
precautionary political culture necessary to repair that legitimacy. Skogstad elaborates, however, 
noting that the “EU regulatory regime incorporated elements of both the precautionary and 
scientific rationality political cultures in an effort to respond to internal and external accountability 
standards.” 131  As the Juncker Commission mentions in its 2015 Better Regulations 
pronouncement, the EU is fundamentally a political entity that must make choices based first and 
foremost on their political consequences, and thus cannot be expected to rest beholden to scientific 
consensus when it is not politically expedient to do so. Furthermore, the EU’s democratic deficit 
provides even stronger impetus to build political capital and public goodwill. The issue of 
genetically modified organisms is one that has attracted great antipathy from members of Europe’s 
ecologically- and health-minded constituents, and as a result, heeding the calls for dismissal of 
Anne Glover, abolition of the post of Commission Science Advisor, and devolution of GMO policy 
to member state governments represents a clear way to demonstrate both “input” and “output” 
legitimacy of the EU as a democratic institution; in addition, any act of regulatory devolution holds 
the possibility of currying favor with Euroskeptics as well.  
Whereas the primary EU regulatory framework was technocratic before the 1990s 
groundswell of public demands for regulatory participation, the EU responded by moving along 
the spectrum from technocratic in the direction of decisionistic, arriving in the Barroso 
administration at something perhaps resembling a Habermasian pragmatist regime, a hybrid 
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structure in which public input was valued alongside scientific input as evidenced by the presence 
of Anne Glover as Science Advisor to the EU commissioner.  
Why has the Juncker administration engaged in this shift towards a politicization of its 
regulatory endeavors – a shift that by definition represents and move away of a policy that is 
nominally “science based” in its regulation of health and safety concerns? Why did Jean Claude 
Juncker dismiss his science advisor for what many observers contend is based primarily on her 
opinions relating to GMOs? 
Though expert and public consensus may have been divergent since the beginnings of the 
European Union, this divergence has only recently come to the fore in the discourse of European 
policymakers. As Habermas himself states, “the European Union owes its existence to the efforts 
of political elites who were able to count on the passive consent of their more or less indifferent 
populations as long as the peoples could regard the Union as being also in their economic interests, 
all things considered. The Union legitimized itself in the eyes of its citizens primarily through the 
results it produced rather than by fulfilling the citizens’ political will.”132 As the low-hanging fruit 
of European integration came to be exhausted, however, as the Agent escaped the strict and limited 
desires of the Principals, and as the “constituency for Europe” became large and diverse enough 
that it began to sprout divisions and differences of opinion, the needs for greater political and social 
input into the European Union naturally grew. There arose a “a gulf … between the citizens’ 
opinion- and will-formation and the policies actually pursued.”133 This was visible even over the 
tenure of President Juncker: whereas his earlier addresses and positions called for greater 
                                                          





institutionalization and “more Europe,” subsequent speeches have recognized the need to respond 
to dissent and difference of opinion on major policy areas.134 
In its quest for democratic legitimacy and the need to respond to societal pressures and the 
concerted efforts of political actors, the European Commission has increasingly turned to 
regulatory structures that include more egalitarian, democratic non-expert participation.  A primary 
example, the Participatory Technology Assessments mentioned in Chapter I, demonstrate the 
trend. Proponents of the practice cite the general benefits derived from more inclusive evaluation 
processes, and the fact that a wider panel of stakeholders can present wider perspectives on 
possible outcomes and externalities of new technologies. Further, the democratic deficit and 
declining legitimacy in the EU is on the minds of policymakers; the EU therefore has embraced 
need for more egalitarian participatory democracy.  
The trends and debates over the structure and ideology behind GMO regulation came to a 
head in 2017 with the authorization process of two varieties of GM Maize. The EU Commission’s 
inability to halt the authorization of these GMOs has resulted in several overt demonstrations of 
frustration, and has led to the Commission to put forward a comitology reform proposal that would 
be, in short, to shift comitology procedure towards a more Decisionistic regulatory model, one in 
which “decisions are discussed at the appropriate political level” and that is capable of “ensuring 
political input.” As critiqued by Habermas, this Decisionistic move does little to gain any further 
public involvement in the decisionmaking process; rather, it merely opens the decisions to slightly 
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greater public scrutiny and public “acclamation”; that is, citizens only feel that they are given a 
more active voice in the discussions since broader interest groups are involved, when in fact it may 
merely be the case that a greater variety of experts is involved and contact between decisionmaking 
and the “life-world” remains minimal.  
However, the consequences of this regulatory trajectory run far deeper. Indeed, they cut to 
the heart of several ongoing dilemmas in regulatory policymaking, and threaten the integrity, 

















Two Dimensions of Dilemmas 
 
The Juncker Commission’s goals of protecting European health and responding to popular 
opinion may be substantive and valid reasons for implementing reforms. However, as with many 
public policy choices, there are tradeoffs that must be accounted for, and the Juncker Commission 
may be underestimating the negative externalities that are likely to result from the proposed GMO 
regulatory proposals. The “Regulator’s dilemma” proposed by Kapstein refers to the tradeoff that 
exists between competitiveness on the one hand and safety on the other. “Public officials have 
been forced to make tradeoffs between domestic regulation on the one hand and international 
competitiveness on the other;”135 that is to say, cutting regulatory corners, allowing pollution, and 
lowering the testing standards of new products can allow companies to maintain lower costs and 
be more competitive internationally. The different solutions to this dilemma have led to highly 
divergent regulatory outcomes in the United States and the European Union, for example, with the 
US by and large opting for a more economically motivated equilibrium, and the EU a more safety-
oriented one; “over the last fifteen years, the EU has enacted a number of health, safety and 
environmental regulations which are more restrictive than their American counterparts,” much to 
the consternation of both parties regarding bilateral trade and regulation.136 
This regulatory dilemma has not always been a source of great international disagreement; 
“the successful negotiation of a common standard of adequacy of capital by the G-10 countries 
was due to the development of consensual knowledge regarding systemic risks, combined with 
decisive leadership…international coordination reflected the interplay of knowledge and power.”  
However, for the past several decades the EU has been moving toward more restrictive regulatory 
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frameworks relative to the United States. To explain this difference in regulatory trajectories and 
the resulting conflicts of interest of different parties, Smith emphasizes the critical role of court 
decisions and industry access to regulatory mechanisms, and in addition expands the regulatory 
dilemma into a “regulatory trilemma” in the EU context in which EU Integration, Economic 
Competitiveness, and Environmental/Health outcomes represent three points of the trilemma – 
regulators cannot fully pursue all three at once”137. 
In the following section, several examples will illustrate the ways in which this regulatory 
trilemma applies to the current case of GMO regulations; specifically the Juncker Commission’s 
plans to move regulation in the direction of greater health and safety-inspired restrictions would 
come at the cost of both EU integration (threatening the Single Market) and external economic 
competitiveness (embroiling the EU in a new round of WTO disputes and deterring biotechnology 
progress).  
Moreover, the following examples will illustrate that alongside the regulator’s dilemma or 
trilemma, when public opinion diverges significantly from scientific opinion, there is an entirely 
different dimension at work: that between public legitimacy on the one hand and scientific 
legitimacy on the other. In pursuing this regulatory course, the Juncker Commission is willing to 
sacrifice scientific input and the advice of the scientific community for the sake of political 
legitimacy – a classic example of a Schumpeterian Public Choice dilemma that illustrates the hot 
button conflict between technocracy and democracy. 
European Integration: The Single Market 
 
One corner of the Regulator’s Trilemma is the drive for EU integration; the Juncker 
Commission’s proposals would devalue that goal for the sake of more tightly regulating GMOs. 
                                                          




Although “the Commission suggested that this proposal should be modelled on another EU law, 
on GMOs intended for cultivation, which entered into force in early April 2015,”  such a parallel 
is spurious, for the two processes are substantially different: cultivation takes place entirely within 
the territory of one country, and physical territory cannot blend into a multinational institution. 138 
The Single Market, however, is a multinational institution at the very core of European Union 
policy. The 1978 European Court of Justice case Rewe Zentral AG vs. Bundesmonopolverwaltun 
für Branntwein, more popularly known as the “Cassis de Dijon” case, established that any national 
laws that “have effects equivalent to those of quantitative restrictions” are in violation of the EEC 
Treaty “as they directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market.”139 As the 
European Parliament news release noted following the 2015 vote, “whereas cultivation necessarily 
takes place on a member state’s territory, GMO trade crosses borders, which means that a national 
“sales and use” ban could be difficult or impossible to enforce without reintroducing border checks 
on imports.”140  Parliament Rapporteur Giovanni La Via recapitulated the nature of the vote: 
“Today’s vote gave a clear signal to the European Commission. This proposal could turn on its 
head what has been achieved with the Single Market and the customs union.”141 Although it is 
worth considering that there are currently opt-outs on health and safety grounds in the European 
Union, it is worth considering that such health and safety exceptions constitute narrow ranges of 
products, whereas GMO goods represent entire industries and regional products.142  In 2017, 
Spain’s cultivation of GM crops topped 120,000 hecates, or 1,200 square kilometers; possibly 
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much larger (though there is no data either way) is the scale of EU-wide production of processed 
foods that may incorporate GM inputs.143 
Perhaps most significantly, these proposed border controls come at a time when Europe’s 
principle of open borders, and the integrity of the Schengen Area, are under duress due the 
migration controls imposed during the refugee crisis; in September 2015, a World Economic 
Forum reported gave consideration to the question “is this the end of Schengen?” with many other 
scholars and commentators sharing in the concern. 144  Several Member States have imposed 
migration-related border controls continuing at least through November 2018.145 A one-two punch 
of migration controls along with customs and Single Market restrictions would be a serious blow 
to the integrity of the principle of the EU’s Four Freedoms – free movement of goods, services, 
capital, and persons. If movement of persons can be restricted in a migration crisis, and movement 
of goods can be restricted for health concerns, would it not be justified to impose capital controls 
in the event of a new financial crisis, or to halt recognition of foreign professional licensing in 
order to ensure quality services for consumers? Simply put, norms and precedents matter (to wit: 
the internal Schengen controls were initially proposed as temporary emergency measures but have 
now been in effect for three years), and restriction of movement of persons alone is already 
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precipitating a crisis of faith in the European project; adding to it with a restriction in the Single 




Economic Competitiveness: The WTO and Biotech Investment 
 
A second point on the Regulator’s Trilemma is the drive for economic competitiveness; 
unfortunately, this, too would take a blow for the sake of increasing GMO regulations. In addition 
to the endogenous factors compelling the Commission not to undertake the reforms, there is an 
exogenous reason: the negative consequences of trade protectionism. While the precautionary 
principle and democratic legitimacy may be sufficient reasons from an EU perspective to allow 
member states to prevent the marketing of GMOs on their territories, international actors tend to 
view things differently. From the perspective of the WTO, trade protectionism is about ends, not 
means. The question of trade protectionism has little to do with the reasons countries or trade blocs 
may put certain policies into place, but rather those policies have effects: a health-related policy, 
not backed by sufficient scientific evidence, that has the effect of serving as a trade barrier is as 
much a trade barrier as a tariff explicitly conceived as such.146 
Through its Dispute Settlement mechanism, the World Trade Organization arbitrates 
international trade disputes brought before it by complainants. Though the European 
Commission’s proposed reforms are neither approved nor tested, there is little need for idle 
speculation on the matter of a WTO verdict on their potential trade-limiting effects; indeed, the 
WTO has already ruled on such a case. In 2003, the United States, supported by Canada and 
                                                          





Argentina, lodged an official complaint with the WTO alleging that the European Communities 
“has applied a moratorium on the approval of biotech products…the approvals moratorium has 
restricted imports of agricultural and food products from the United States.” The complaint further 
held that “the member States maintain a number of national marketing and import bans on biotech 
products even though those products have already been approved by the EC…The national 
marketing and import bans have restricted imports of agricultural and food products from the 
United States.”147 Though the European Communities “categorically denied the existence of such 
a moratorium,” the panel ultimately found that such a moratorium indeed existed, and accepted 
the parties’ requests to work outside the WTO framework toward a mutually agreeable solution.148 
However, although some loosening of EU regulatory framework has occurred, the dispute has not 
been officially closed; as of the most recent update to the dispute, dated July 10, 2018, “the 
European Union remains ready to continue its discussions with the United States with the goal of 
resolving this dispute and related issues.” 
The ongoing WTO dispute, the possibility of renewed WTO complaints by the United 
States and other exporters of GMO agricultural goods, and the demonstrated willingness of the 
United States (under the Trump administration) to implement tariffs on the EU, all serve as 
significant inducements for the EU to loosen its existing regulatory stance on GMOs and other 
biotech products. The possibility of this regulatory framework being reformed in a way that would 
not loosen but rather tighten the regulatory process and serve as an even more impenetrable trade 
barrier should be examined with the utmost caution. A regulatory regime that would effectively 
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devolve the approval process for GMOs to Member State governments would create a host of new 
possible disputes between countries such as the United States and individual EU members states. 
Beyond the WTO angle, an increasing restriction in GMO sales in production would be 
disastrous for the EU’s competitiveness in the biotech sector and jeopardize the EU’s “Europe 
2020” goal of transitioning to a knowledge based economy. To put this in a global perspective, 
Chinese investment in biotechnology is soaring, with $5.1 billion invested in US biotech firms in 
the first half of 2017, and the Chinese biologics market expected to grow 16% by 2021, compared 
to only 6% for Europe and 9% for the United States.149 The number of biotechnology firms in 
Europe is only 71% that of the United States, despite a larger overall population and economy. 
Although the connection with GMO policy is difficult to demonstrate directly, it is worth noting 
that the plurality (33%) of those firms are located in GMO-friendly Spain, despite its contributing 
only one tenth of the EU’s total population and a fraction of the overall GDP of the EU.150 In short, 
Europe’s biotech sector is dangerously close to falling further behind the leadership of American, 
Chinese, and other firms. Or, as scathingly encapsulated by a agricultural industry group, “The EU 
regulatory system is increasingly based on hazard and the precautionary principle rather than risk, 
in contrast to regulatory bodies in other regions. This has resulted in fewer crop protection products 
and GM seed varieties being available to farmers in the EU, as opposed to other regions such as 
the USA and Brazil. This situation also makes the region less attractive as a focus for private 
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companies’ research and development.”151 More generally, there is a perception that Europe is 
slipping away from leadership in science and technology, with increasingly stringent restrictions 
on telecommunications or private data recently. “You see in Europe the idea that technology’s 
against us, and we should resist this rather than embrace it. A very negative spirit, which I think 
is a good example of how adventure has disappeared from the European psyche,” surely not an 
attitude conducive to economic growth and competitiveness.152 
 
The Second Dimension: Public Choice 
 
The above sections demonstrate how a more restrictive regulatory regime for GMOs would 
be harmful on the grounds of both EU integration and global economic competitiveness. The 
comitological and regulatory reforms proposed by the Juncker Commission aim to solve a cluster 
of related problems. Aside from resolving the committee deadlocks that have gripped EU GMO 
regulatory proceedings for years, the reform would also respond to the pressure of interest groups 
and the expressed opinions of large portions of the European populace regarding GMOs, as well 
as set a precedent of increased democratic and participatory input in health and safety regulations, 
helping to alleviate some elements of the EU’s longstanding democratic deficit. Those goals, 
namely the last, are highly important for the continued legitimacy of European institutions, and 
steps must be taken to resolve them before discontent festers and environmental groups and green 
parties find common cause with Euroskeptic nationalists. 
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However, there are numerous reasons why the reforms have not been implemented, and 
indeed would result in several difficulties if implemented in their present form. First, scientific 
opinion diverges significantly from popular opinion on the matter of the safety of genetically 
modified foods, setting the conditions for a so-called Schumpeterian “public choice dilemma.” 
Second, by allowing internal prohibitions on the sale of GMOs, the EU risks sacrificing economic 
competitiveness in biotechnology, as encapsulated in the so-called Regulator’s Dilemma – a 
position that continues to be prohibited by WTO rulings in an ongoing trade dispute with the 
United States. Further, devolution could represent a watershed moment of using subsidiarity to 
avoid a compromise solution at the EU Commission level, threatening to undo decades of 
regulatory harmonization and EU-wide standardization. Even the fundamental principle of the 
Single Market could be under threat if GM products are allowed to be blocked from the market in 
some EU countries and not others, with the specter of a WTO dispute involving several European 
countries. When combined with the previous Regulator’s Dilemma, this option has major 
implications for the European Regulation Trilemma as encapsulated by Smith. 
 
The Crisis of Public Choice 
 
The introduction touches on Giovanni Tagliabue’s criticism of EU GMO regulatory policy 
as a Public Choice dilemma. An examination of the concept of Schumpeterian Public Choice 
explains what Tagliabue means with this so-called dilemma. According to Mitchell (1984), Dennis 
Mueller delivers the accepted definition of Public Choice:  “…the economic study of nonmarket 
decision making, or simply the application of economics to political science… The basic postulate 
of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer.”153 
                                                          





Schumpeter’s contribution to the field is pivotal. In the conceptualization of Mitchell, Schumpeter 
was purely critical of the role of the individual in making optimal decisions on matters of public 
affairs; whereas in matters of labor or finance in which the individual was forced to place his 
livelihood or reputation on the line, in formulating opinions on political issues the average person 
was content to build his beliefs and positions in affective, emotional, and illogical foundations: 
“… the prime minister in a democracy might be likened to a horseman who is so 
fully engrossed in trying to keep in the saddle that he cannot plan his ride, or to a 
general so fully occupied with making sure that his army will accept his orders that 
he must leave strategy to care for itself.”154  
 
In short, Schumpeter felt that democratic involvement meant that policy decisions became 
subordinated to political decisions – that responsibility to pleasing the people, remaining in office, 
and preserving public perceptions in front of people who might not understand the issues was 
invariably bound to become more important than fine-tuning the perfect policies which might 
ultimately result in “better” outcomes for the people.  
And indeed a rift has opened in recent years between popular conceptions and “elites’” 
opinions on GM food. In David Toke’s “The Politics of GM Food,” the editors’ note points out 
that “Over recent years environmental politics has moved from a peripheral interest to a central 
concern within the discipline of politics.”155 Writing in 2007, Kurzer & Cooper saw the GMO 
issue in very simple Expert-Populous terms: “While the Commission is keen to normalize the 
commercialization of biotechnology foods and crops, European consumers refuse to eat/buy 
products containing genetically modified organisms (GMO) and have effectively closed the market 
to GMO.” 156 What Tagliaube means to say, therefore, in describing GMO policy as a series of 
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Schumpeterian public choice decisions, is that regulators must balance science-driven policy on 
the one hand and political-driven policy on the other - and then argues that they are balancing in 
the wrong way. 
 The Schumpeterian view is a pessimistic one, essentially painting a portrait in which 
policymakers must choose between what is popular and what they consider to be good policy. This 
is not to say that such prioritization is irrational; elected officials in democratic societies have every 
reason to listen to their constituents and respond to their desires. Schumpeter’s concern, rather, is 
the extent to which democratic choice-structures encourage elected leaders to respond to popular 
desires which may be out of tune with expert consensus or “good policy”; the possibility of a 
divergence of good policy from popular policy has been recognized by philosophers and politicians 
since ancient times. 157  However, this dilemma is not without hope for the modern liberal 
democratic state, and leaves a bright spot of central importance to this investigation. Schumpeter 
advocated one force in government to counteract the “populist” tendencies of elected political 
leaders: a strong bureaucracy capable of moderating democratic vicissitudes. “Bureaucracy is the 
main answer to the argument about government by amateurs …[it] must be strong enough to guide 
and, if need be, instruct the politicians who head the ministries…It must be a power in its own 
right.”158 However, the question of the relative power of democratic input versus professional 
bureaucratic expertise is the crux of the discussion that remains unresolved since the mid-20th 
century: the choice between technocracy and democracy. 
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The Advocacy Coalition Framework Response 
 Work on the role of coalitions in policymaking stands counter to such a simplistic and 
binary division between “elite” and “popular” views, or even between policymakers and 
constituencies. To the former dichotomy, through coalitions, “elite” and “popular” views exist 
together in advocacy networks which influence and draw from each other and organize around a 
particular set of issues. To the second dichotomy, “although brokers and sovereigns are separated 
analytically, it is often difficult to know where coalitions end and policy-makers begin, since 
governmental organizations may often appear to hold, and act on, beliefs consistent with those of 
a particular advocacy coalition.”159 In this case, it is possible that President Juncker, rather than 
simply “choosing” between a “popular” and an “elite” policy preference, may be allied with or 
part of the Anti-Biotech coalition (at least on the issue of GMOs) and as such may favor, or may 
assign greater weight to the arguments for, tighter GMO regulations. However, as discussed in 
Chapter I, the ACF may not adequately model the relatively apolitical scientific community; in 
particular, given the clear message and position of national and EU-wide scientific bodies on the 
subject of GMO regulation,  there does exist a sufficiently stark division between the a majority 
policy preference of EU citizens and a policy preference of the scientific community to model this 
division as a Schumpeterian Public Choice dilemma. Further, even if coalitional behaviors do 
dominate the policy preference of both groups, there is still an important matter to be decided: 
what should the relative weight be between the interests of subject matter experts and non-
specialist citizens--or in this case between science or politics? 
 
                                                          





Technocracy Versus Democracy 
 
The struggle between whether science or democracy should have the upper hand in 
regulatory decisionmaking has only been succinctly laid out in the past few decades. “Jasanoff 
(1990) talked about how the debate about the role of science in regulation had been polarised 
between those arguing from a ‘democratic’ viewpoint who saw scientists as making a distorted 
contribution to regulatory outcomes and those arguing from a ‘technocratic viewpoint’ who argued 
that only scientists made, or should make, regulatory judgements.” 160  While this is a new 
conceptualization, it is only a recent reincarnation of an extremely old debate: that between the 
wisdom of the crowd and the insight of the Expert. Schumpeter, writing from a rationalist, 
positivist perspective, had the naive luxury of writing before the onslaught of structuralist 
constructivism in the mid 20th century. As historian of science Thomas Kuhn demonstrated in his 
seminal 1970 work On the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, science is and has always been a 
politicized tool inseparable from the sociopolitical perspectives in which it is implemented. But 
just as Kuhn demonstrates that the nature of science changes drastically given social, political, 
economic, and technological contexts, so too must the nature of the political and governmental 
apparatuses that employ them also change. Whereas even in the mid-20th century, allowing public 
input into the regulatory decisionmaking process entailed a high bar in terms of access and 
connections to the forums of such decisionmaking, as well as difficult technological and 
communicational hurdles in terms of creating nationwide interest groups around narrow regulatory 
issues, the nature of modern mass communication and civil society allows massive networks of 
grassroots activism to drive agendas and spread particular viewpoints to a degree that was difficult 
                                                          




in earlier decades in Western regulatory states.161 “Kuhn’s discussion of scientific communities 
also appears to signal an important way in which his ‘paradigm’ approach may, at first glance, not 
be compatible with the study of GM crop and food regulatory discourses. This is because the 
composition of the scientific regulatory committees is designated precisely by the political 
mechanisms which Kuhn proscribes.” 162  
Winterfeldt advocates a diplomatic approach in seeking a unification of scientific 
knowledge and political decisionmaking. “Science can and should help decision makers by 
shaping their beliefs. Unfortunately, science is not easily accessible to decision makers, and 
scientists often do not understand decision makers’ information needs.” 163 
However, the rift between the two realms of science and policy may be deeper than a simple 
informational gap. Indeed, “science  and democracy  operate within  distinct value-spheres that  
are  not necessarily consonant with  each  other.”164 That is to say, scientific evidence is not subject 
to democracy, and introducing democratic input into scientific questions of truth is not necessarily 
a productive enterprise likely to arrive at a greater or broader truth.  “There are doubts,” reasonably, 
“whether it is possible to combine the scientific and participatory components of the TA 
[technology assessment] process without weakening the scientific part of it.” 165 In his book Ethics 
and Technology Assessment, the culmination of research work involving funding by both UK and 
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EU institutions, professor Matthew Cotton notes that “Though there are those that see PSE 
[participatory scientific evaluation] as an inherently good thing due to the emphasis on 
decentralised power structures and civic empowerment, to some critics public participation in 
technology decision-making leads to control by public sentiment, leading to the detriment of 
scientifically defined safety”166 Cotton notes that the emphasis on the “expert” decision-maker is 
the result of an ideology of “administrative rationalism” in which the “role of the expert is placed 
in primacy in social problem solving, and where social relations of hierarchy are stressed over 
those of equality of competition”; he concludes, however, that “if science and engineering-based 
criteria come under attack, this would be detrimental to the success (and safety) of any given design 
and so, perhaps ironically, citizen involvement would not be in the public interest.” Placing the 
participatory technology assessment at the center of regulatory policy affords scientists a more 
marginal role influencing what is ultimately a test of perception and rhetoric. 
Thus, there exists substantial literature that problematizes the democratization of 
regulatory decisionmaking, and the EU’s increasing resort to such mechanisms may be based on a 
false “assumption of a ‘higher wisdom’ of lay knowledge” deriving from particular pluralistic faith 
in constructivist worldviews, which is arguably incompatible with the structure of scientific 
decisionmaking. The convergence of unrelated factors in popular discourse and in the collective 
consciousness can drastically impact the route of participatory regulatory decisionmaking. One 
particularly stark example was the way in which rbST, a milk production hormone approved for, 
and in wide use in, the US dairy industry, came into EU regulatory questioning at the same time 
as the “introduction of milk quotas and widespread concern in Europe with the use of hormones 
in meat,” as a result of which “scientific evaluation gave way to political debate and socioeconomic 
                                                          




imperatives,” ensuring that “rbST was never likely to be licensed.”167 To better illustrate the 
application to GMOs, “The European directive on GMOs (European Communities, 2001, Article 
4) states: ‘Member States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle, ensure that all 
appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and the environment 
which might arise from the deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs’. The directive 
leaves open what precisely can be considered as an ‘adverse effect on human health and the 
environment’. The directive also leaves open what could be ‘a sufficient demonstration of safety’, 
let alone that it defines the degree of uncertainty which could justify restricted use or a ban of a 
particular GMO.”168 
 Two competing views of the role of democracy in regulatory decisionmaking then seem to 
dominate, distilled down to differing answers to a central question: does democratic input 
introduce, or does it prevent the introduction of, political priorities into the scientific evaluation 
process? Critics of democratic input argue that opening up regulation to participatory technology 
assessment and political oversight impedes the attainment of purely scientific conclusions: “there, 
obviously, exist tensions between public legitimization needs (insulating science from policy) and 
practical action requirements.”169 Proponents of democratic input argue that there may already be 
unknowable amounts of political and ideologic input going behind closed doors in the regulatory 
laboratories, and that opening these processes up to democratic scrutiny shines light onto an 
otherwise surreptitious affair: “The BSE crisis was interpreted as a result, at least partly, of a 
regulatory regime marked by a non-transparent intermingling of the roles of assessment and 
management, and of scientific and non-scientific consideration” and “safeguarding scientific 
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analysis against distortion by inappropriate policy influences and considerations is intended to re-
establish and assure the credibility of risk assessment activities and results on which risk 
management decisions are to be based.”170  
To recapitulate, the implications of this age-old debate on the current question of 
comitological and regulatory reform are significant. The proposed reforms would continue an 
ongoing trend of reducing the role of scientific input vis-à-vis simple political majorities and non-
scientific input into regulatory affairs. There are, of course, strong arguments in favor of such a 
reform, but as demonstrated above there is substantial reason to be wary. To repeat the warning of 
Cotton, “if science and engineering-based criteria come under attack[…]perhaps ironically, citizen 
involvement would not be in the public interest.”171 On the other hand, scientists must embrace 
the idea that  “influence requires persuasion and that hierarchies of evidence are not relevant for 
policy-making” – i.e., science and engineering-based criteria do not legislate themselves.172 
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Resolutions and Conclusions 
 
The regulation of genetically modified organisms thus poses a quandary for European 
institutions. On the one hand, a stable and active majority of EU citizens is generally opposed to 
GMOs, a plurality of member state governments represents their cause, and EU Commission 
President Juncker has made clear that the status quo is undemocratic and threatens to undermine 
the legitimacy of European regulatory bodies at a nadir of popularity. On the other hand, the 
reforms proposed by the Juncker Administration threaten to either dilute scientific input into the 
regulatory process or to erode the Single Market; and either reform would open European member 
states to a series of WTO trade disputes that they seem, based on recent historical precedent, likely 
to lose. 
 Though the argument in favor or legitimacy is a strong one that must be responded to (to 
be discussed below), the dangers of enacting the Commission’s proposed reforms – flagging  
economic competitiveness, new trade disputes with close allies at a time of rising geopolitical 
tensions, and a deepening culture of opening scientific regulatory processes to lay involvement 
that may increasingly privilege protection over innovation – collectively pose a greater danger to 
the long-term success of the European project. As the Group of Chief Science Advisors of the European 
Commission remind us, “there is danger that unless the EU improves the regulatory environment for 
products of gene-editing, it will be left behind in this field, which could also diminish EU influence on 
ongoing debates at the international level with respect to specific applications and regulatory processes.” 
Further, as Kurzer and Cooper note, as GMO cultivation and innovation continue across the rest of the 
world, it may be that the European Union as a net food importer will be forced to pay higher prices for rarer 
and rarer non-GMO crops, driving the neutral consumer out of any fellow feeling with the anti-GMO 
coalition, ultimately making the current regime a pyrrhic victory for the coalition.173 Indeed, based on the 
                                                          




complete lack of traction that Commission proposals have received in the EU parliament, with the 
2015 “opt-outs” proposal having languished at Parliament’s door for three years, the status quo 
seems to be the most likely outcome for this conflict.174 Though government must strive generally 
to respond to popular sentiments and the impact of transparency and multidisciplinary input on the 
quality of policymaking must not be understated, there are circumstances (such as Brexit) in which 
citizens may popularly desire something in the short term without fulling understanding or 
supporting the long-term negative externalities that may result from the feasible implementations 
thereof; in those circumstances, as Schumpeter conceptualizes, it may fall to apolitical 
bureaucracies to provide a countervailing opinion in favor of the long-term best interests of the 
polity. Though the authoritarian possibilities inherent in that perspective are worrisome, so too are 
the possibilities of a democratic populism that rejects scientific consensus and does not 
contemplate long-term consequences of policy preferences. The vox populi alone cannot reshape 
the structure of international trade agreements or alter the results of scientific studies. 
However, as discussed in Chapter III, the status quo runs the risk of allowing an ongoing 
legitimacy crisis to fester (the far-right Alternative für Deutschland has already adopted an anti-
GMO position, possible seeking common cause with anti-GMO activists against European 
regulation) and an outright concession on the part of President Juncker would earn a swift rebuke 
from the anti-biotech coalition, who have already criticized him for even slight moderation on the 
issue.175 Thus, there are some immediate options the Juncker Regime could adopt to increase 
transparency into the authorization process without actually altering the structure of the process in 
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a way that reduces the role of scientists: making public the results of comitology proceedings, and 
altering the requirements of the EFSA safety studies. First, the proposal by the Commission to 
disclose the vote totals of the committee that oversees GMO authorization should be 
implemented.176 By revealing how Member State representatives vote, skepticism at the opaque 
nature of reform could be alleviated even without having a direct impact on the votes themselves. 
Second, there is an opportunity to improve the transparency of the EFSA risk evaluation process: 
by opening to scrutiny or public research the health and environmental studies submitted as part 
of the application process. As it stands, an entity applying for GMO authorization (namely, a 
biotechnology company or research institution) submits its own studies on health and safety, which 
are then scrutinized by the EFSA and the member state acting on behalf of the applicant.177 Though 
all such materials are available for viewing on the EFSA website and public commentary is 
solicited, it is unclear how the commentary is used, if at all. Rather, this process could be 
democratized or transparentized by requiring public European universities or institutes to conduct 
peer review processes on all applications, or opening such studies to crowd review. Further, the 
fact that proprietary company data is sometimes not disclosed in these regulatory proceedings is 
something that should also be reformed: even if scientific review finds a GMO safe for human 
consumption, any consumer should have a right to knowledge about the nature and effect of a 
genetic modification. 
If stricter GMO regulations do go into place, however, it merits thinking through how to 
minimize the unwanted consequences. Though several options exist, a few are immediately salient: 
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softening or scaling back the nature of GMO opt-outs, accepting or finding creative settlements in 
a WTO dispute, or renegotiating WTO rules regarding GMOs. 
First, there is the possibility of the Commission recalibrating its opt-outs proposal to allow 
member states to ban GMOs on their territories, but limit the ways in which these bans can be 
enforced so as to minimally impact the functioning of the common market. Stipulations could be 
created that would prevent border screenings or any other impediment to freedom of movement of 
goods or persons, limiting enforcement of GMO bans to mild civil actions at the level of individual 
companies for selling GM products. Though this streamlined proposal might be more palatable to 
a sufficiently large portion of the Parliament, it runs the risk of incensing new parties, such as free 
trade advocates, Eurofederalists, and others strong opponents of internal European borders, 
without placating the anti-biotech coalition to any significant degree. At the very least, such a 
move would elicit an outcry from major GMO growers such as Spain and Portugal, as well as 
coalitions of scientists and biotech companies and supporters.  
Second, there is the possibility that the commission could eventually pass its proposed 
comitological reform and continue/resume the moratorium on GMO approvals, come what may 
from the WTO. Though the likelihood of retaliation and defeat is high (the previous dispute is 
technically still unsettled; trade negotiators have had larger issues to contend with in recent years), 
losing a trade dispute is not a fatal blow, and countries routinely find creative settlements that 
allow both parties to preserve their own priorities. For example, when Brazil won a trade dispute 
over US cotton subsidies, the Bush administration negotiated a $300 million payment to a Brazilian 
cotton trade group. 178  The EU commission can decide whether such an economic outlay is 
balanced by the political gains of a renewed moratorium on GMO approvals. 
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Third, if a reform like the above could be passed, the EU has the possibility of seeking a 
renegotiation of WTO rules regarding GMOs. Though there is some international traction on this 
issue, with Russia being one of the largest non-EU supporters of limiting the prevalence of GMOs, 
international reception of GMOs remains large and growing, with Brazil, China, the US and 
Canada among the largest proponents, and roughly 190 million hectares (more than the entire 
arable land area of the US) currently planted with GMOs.179 Considering the already fraught 
process of WTO trade round negotiation (the current Doha round has been inconclusive for 17 
years), this presents a daunting challenge. 
However, the question of GMOs, put into the larger global context, forces us to ask some 
difficult questions. What should policymakers do when the desires of the people contradict the 
views of scientists, of international trade law, or of deeply held organizing principles? Posing the 
question and providing answers are very different prospects, however. In terms of regulatory 
structure, though, the Technocratic and Decisionistic models may seem to be at opposite ends of a 
one-dimensional spectrum, there do exist other regulatory structures that integrate public and 
expert input in different ways. One example is Habermas’s synthesis, the Pragmatist model, in 
which values are assessed in function of their feasibility and scientific knowledge is assessed in 
function of its sociopolitical implications – essentially a fusion of the other two models. 180 
Habermas’s model is “a significant theoretical attempt to preserve both rationality and democracy 
at the level of political decision making that transcends both technocratic and decisionistic theories 
of rationality”181 “Pragmatism finally is, according to Habermas, a middle way, in which science 
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and politics have an interdependent, discursive relationship and values and knowledge can be 
related effectively to each other.”182 
Alternatively, “the transparent model […] views scientific and socio-political factors as 
intertwined throughout the process of policy making and communication, with reciprocal links 




Figure 4: The Transparent Model (Dryer and Renn, p. 31, from Millstone et al. 2004) 
 
In other words, the Transparent model gives both science and democracy their full hearing, 
equally and in dialog with each other, able to respond and articulate decisions in light of the 
opinions of the other. The emphasis, as the name would suggest, on “transparency” prevents the 
accusations of closeted malfeasance that have proven problematic for the technocratic model in 
the past – while the fact that scientific considerations and input are recurrent prevents the 
accusations of the politicization of science that seem to detract from the Decisionistic model, and 
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serves to maximize “input legitimacy.” These models are, however, only models, and attempting 
to integrate their principles into actual comitological proceedings would be easier said than done. 
Further, and perhaps most importantly, the literature on Coalitions provides excellent 
advice on how scientists may go about better translating their views into policy: “‘Practitioners 
who expect their analysis to have an independent and influential role in shaping policy in contexts 
of this sort are likely to be met with disappointment’ […] Researchers must respond to calls for 
pluralistic and collaborative approaches to knowledge production at the intersection of public 
health and political science particularly as concerns the policy-making process.”184 This is to say, 
scientists in public health cannot rest on their laurels and expect the quality of experiments and 
material data to magically be implemented into policy. Rather, they too must play the game of 
politics and influence via publicizing data, acquiring allies, and forming coalitions around their 
science-backed policy views. So, too, must proponents of science-backed policy ally with 




The issues raised in this investigation are not likely to dissipate soon. They primarily deal, 
like this thesis, with two themes: the political institutions of the European Union, and the 
interaction between science and democracy. 
To the former, the GMO issue is one more piece of evidence that the institutions of the 
European Union are in limbo between the national and the supranational. As Habermas notes, 
political community, political power, and political culture “come together in a congruent fashion 
only at the national level” even though the national governments are bound within higher 
                                                          




institutions.185 As evidenced by the intractable division between governments on the policy of 
GMO regulation, there is a conflict between the policy preferences and discourses that are formed 
at national levels and the institutional capacity to enact those preferences that exists at a 
supranational level beyond the immediate reach of the national will-formation. The GMO issue 
adds to the list of issues, along with migration and border control, Euro interest rates, and others, 
in which national preferences may differ greatly but a transnational or supranational solution must 
ultimately be negotiated. Though the status quo may be tenable, it hardly seems preferable to a 
more decisive answer on the question of sovereignty and policymaking authority. Habermas and 
other propose that the answer is “more Europe,” though populist nationalists counter with a bid for 
a renationalization of many competencies. 
 
To the latter, science and technology may be developing more rapidly than deliberative 
democratic structures can keep up. For example, in November 2018 it was revealed that the 
Japanese minister for cybersecurity does not use computers and is “not familiar with cybersecurity,” 
an incident that recalls the 2006 quote by Ted Stevens, then-chair of the US Senate committee 
overseeing net neutrality regulations, that “the internet[…]is a series of tubes” – these examples 
serve to show that the bureaucratic and deliberative structures that elevate individuals to authority 
over technological regulations may not always (if ever) do so on the basis of familiarity with the 
technologies in question.186 This dissonance stands to widen if and as the technological complexity 
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and specificity of modern regulatory concerns continues to grow. Even before the GMO issue 
arrives at any kind of lasting settlement, gene editing technologies have already begun entering the 
public discourse, and an European Court of Justice ruling places them, unwieldily, into the same 
category as the GMO technology that has existed for decades; even before cryptocurrency caught 
the attention of regulators the market for then was already in the billions of dollars.187 And all of 
these regulatory issues promise to be philosophically and politically puerile compared to questions 
such as Artificial Intelligence. The theory of Rational Ignorance, commonly associated with Public 
Choice theory, centers on the idea that there are some things that it is not rational to spend time 
learning, and therefore that no one should rationally try to become knowledgeable on every 
topic.188 Further, work on the relationship between Rational Ignorance and Democracy notes that 
voters are likely to avoid informing themselves when they feel their impact as a voter is low, and 
also when they feel they have already made a moral decision on an issue – a set of findings that 
may make a moral/environmental question like GMOs, in the context of a democratic deficit, 
particularly subject to irrational choice formation.189 In 2016 (the last year for which data was 
available), the number of tertiary degrees awarded in the EU in biology, environmental science, or 
medicine was roughly a quarter million – a small fraction of the 4.4 million who received degrees 
of the same level in other fields that year, let alone of the total population coming of age at the 
same time.190 While repudiating the implication that only by attaining a degree in biology or 
related fields can one understand the issue of GMOs, it is clear that the proportion of European 
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academic expertise in a field is outmatched by the number of Europeans with strong political 
feelings on the issue.191 As the complexity and number of issues affecting the public sphere 
continues to grow, perhaps the possibility exists that we are entering an age in which a fundamental 
informational assumption of democracy – that the average citizen can, in a reasonable amount of 
time, acquire a working proficiency in a variety of subjects of public interest and make informed 
votes and choices in the matter – is not necessarily true any longer.192  
Although deliberative democracy may be slow and cumbersome, the answer to this 
lethargy cannot be the technocratic authoritarianism of the past, for it has the possibility of being 
even more regressive and reactionary than current regulatory structures. Opaque, slow, behind-
closed-doors decisions are not satisfying for the public interest. But online, democratized, non-
hierarchical platforms can be innately legitimate and responsive. There are more inclusive 
technologies and possibilities. In his newest edition of Revolt of the Public, former NSA analyst 
Martin Gurri sees this issue as an ongoing battle between networked, non-hierarchical 
organizations now have the tools to attack and flatten authority, while the authorities struggle to 
reclaim legitimacy and rebuild hierarchies, a struggle that calls to mind Habermas. Gurri proposes 
that was is necessary is a synthesis of these centrifugal and centripetal forces; governments and 
authorities must figure out ways to embrace or coopt these non-hierarchical mass organizational 
structures. Some ways in which Gurri’s ideas might be realized include the expansion of online 
democracy platforms such as the Obama Administration’s We the People project, blockchain 
tracking on votes and campaign contributions, or online platforms for drafting and crowd-sourcing 
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legislation and votes. The legitimacy of scientific and academic work may be improved by Crowd 
review. 
Though the precise nature of the European regulatory and comitological procedure may 
change in coming months or years, issues like transgenics, gene editing, and other questions of 
biotechnology have already begun to open new political rifts and regulatory challenges. Further 
questions at the interface of science and society, such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and 
others, are likely to pose enormous problems in coming decades as well. Amongst all of these 
areas, quantitative or qualitative investigation could help reveal how affected interest groups 
respond to regulatory action in terms of increasing or decreasing faith or perceptions of legitimacy. 
New structures of participatory input, which take advantage of the mass participatory mechanisms 
of the internet, may need to be adopted, and blockchain-like mechanisms could show constituents 
exactly how their input and votes affected final policy outcomes, thereby potentially increasing 
feelings of buy-in into the system.  
However, there are some more difficult and fundamental questions that may arise from this 
conflict between popular desires and the institutions that constrain them. Do democratic outcomes 
always equate to the policy outcomes that most benefit the polity, or do voters sometimes vote 
against their own self interests? To what extent should governments respond to popular policy 
preferences that are difficult to do, or perhaps may not be, from the perspective of governments or 
experts, the best course of action?  
But as with all new technological advances, society must remain vigilant to the potential 
misuses of these tools. Though the exact balance must vary from society to society and issue to 




for the perils of too much technocracy are well known, but the perils of too much populist 
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